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A Comparative Analysis of the
NFL’s Disciplinary Structure:
The Commissioner’s Power and
Players’ Rights
Cole Renicker*
The power of professional sports commissioners to determine what is
in the “best interests” of their respective sport is a significant aspect of
sports today, and can be traced back to 1921, when the federal courts
authorized then-Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis to act with a
broad range of discretion in protecting the “best interests” of baseball.
This precedent set in motion a long history of commissioners using the
“best interests” of the game power to accomplish various goals, and most
recently has been used to discipline players for alleged misconduct. The
Commissioner of the National Football League, Roger Goodell, has recently been criticized both for using this power to impose initial discipline, and also for using his power under Article XLVI of the NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement to oversee appeals for punishment that he
personally issues. This Note explores the power allotted to the NFL’s
Commissioner under the League’s Constitution and Bylaws, the current
Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the NFL’s Personal Conduct
Policy. It also examines the NFL Commissioner’s power in hearing an
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appeal made by a player for any punishment that is imposed on him. In
order to fully understand the power conferred on the NFL’s Commissioner, this Note compares the power of the NFL’s Commissioner to the
powers of the Commissioners of Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association. Additionally, this Note discusses the disciplinary power afforded to commissioners in non-sports settings, such as the
New York City Police Department and management at Ford Motor
Company, relative to the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary power. Ultimately, this Note proposes that the NFL Commissioner retains his current power to impose initial discipline, albeit with additional due process
rights provided to the players, such as an opportunity to be heard. It then
proposes to reconfigure the players’ appeal rights, providing the players
with an impartial, three-panel arbitration, which is agreed upon by both
the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players’ Association.
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INTRODUCTION
In any sort of labor context, where there is a hierarchy of employment characterized by varying levels of management and subordinate employees, the power to discipline is a bedrock principle
that is crucial to maintaining order in the workplace.1 This power,
typically belonging to management, may take various forms and is
justified in varying circumstances.2 Much like other labor situations, the relationship in the National Football League (“NFL” or
“the League”) between the owners (“Management”) and the
Players’ Union is also impacted by the League’s power to discipline players who do not represent the League adequately.3
Given the popularity of sports and the instantaneousness of
media coverage today, athletes live in an environment where they
must be mindful of their actions at all times.4 With up-to-theminute technology and cameras essentially everywhere, athletes
are front and center in many American homes.5 Despite warnings
against the idolization of athletes,6 people continue to view athletes
as role models, due to both the nature of their profession and their
vast exposure to the public.7
The concept of athletes as role models has paved the way for
leagues and their respective governing bodies to impose discipline
when athletes’ actions do not conform to the “best interests” of
their league.8 It is no secret that professional sports leagues are
1

See Employee Discipline, 16 ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., no. 6, 2001, at 12.
See id.
3
See infra Section I.C.
4
See Sean Bukowski, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 108 (2001) (noting that athletes are high-profile public figures, thus
every aspect of their lives draws media attention).
5
See id.
6
Michael Rose-Ivey, Athletes as Role Models? An Athlete Gives His Take, KNOW IT ALL
FOOTBALL (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.knowitallfootball.com/2014/02/28/athletesrole-models-athlete/ [https://perma.cc/DX3N-R8MS].
7
See Bukowski, supra note 4, at 108. For example, NFL games accounted for fortyfive of the top fifty watched-programs during the course of its 2014–2015 season. Sarah
Bibel, NFL 2014 TV Recap: 202 Million Viewers, Game Viewership Nearly Triples Broadcast
Primetime, ZAP2IT: TV BY THE NUMBERS (Jan. 9, 2015), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it
.com/2015/01/09/nfl-2014-tv-recap-202-million-viewers-game-viewership-nearlytriples-broadcast-primetime/348433/ [https://perma.cc/9XYC-57TJ].
8
Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. XII.B (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 MLB CBA]; see generally Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please:
2

1054

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1051

money-driven industries.9 Thus, when the leagues’ governing bodies feel that their sport—and therefore, their product—is being
devalued due to the poor conduct of their athletes, the governing
bodies take action to curtail the bad behavior.10 Commissioners
take punitive action against athletes primarily through either suspensions or fines, though outright banishments have also been
handed out in particularly admonishing circumstances.11 As a result, the athletes of today must be cognizant not only of their conduct on the field, but also of the people they surround themselves
with, where they go, and what they do away from the stadium or
arena.12
The threat of suspensions or fines has created an adversarial relationship between the players and the governing bodies in sports
leagues such as the NFL, Major League Baseball (“MLB”), and
National Basketball Association (“NBA”).13 For the NFL, this situation has landed at the doorstep of its Commissioner, Roger Goodell.14 During the NFL’s 2015 season, fifty-nine players were suspended solely for their off-the-field conduct.15 Notably, that number is considerably higher than the number of players suspended
Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1645 (1999).
9
See Robert Ambrose, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1069, 1106–07 (2008); see also Tom Van Riper, Thanks to Media, Sports Industry
Growth Set to Accelerate, FORBES: SPORTSMONEY (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2013/11/13/thanks-to-mediasports-industrygrowth-set-to-accelerate/ [https://perma.cc/N8UR-4YZF].
10
See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. 46 § 1(a) (2011) [hereinafter
2011 NFL CBA].
11
See, e.g., John Belaska, 10 Athletes Who Were Banned from Their Sports for Life,
RICHEST (May 25, 2014), http://www.therichest.com/sports/10-athletes-who-werebanned-from-their-sport-for-life/ [https://perma.cc/29BG-758U].
12
See Symposium, From the Arena to the Streets—The Pressures Placed on Athletes,
Entertainers, and Management, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 381, 480–82 (2009).
13
See, e.g., Tom Pelissero, NFLPA Boss DeMaurice Smith Says Roger Goodell Forcing
Union to Use Courts, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/2015/09/04/smith-goodell-nflpa-brady-deflategate/71705650/
[https://perma.cc/EY6B-QN4H].
14
See id.
15
2015 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/finessuspensions/2015/suspensions/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQH-Y4LG] (last visited Feb. 26,
2016).
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solely for their off-the-field conduct in the years prior to 2011.16 A
possible reason for the increase in player discipline is the NFL’s
current Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which took
effect in 2011.17
The current situation in the NFL is a peculiar one, because although the power to discipline exists in almost any workplace, the
means by which punishment is imposed on NFL players, and the
due process rights provided to players when they are punished, are
not necessarily similar to the way punishment is handled in other
labor contexts.18 The NFL has a few key documents, which provide
the Commissioner the power to discipline players, and they are applicable in specific situations. These documents are the League’s
Constitution and Bylaws,19 the CBA,20 the Personal Conduct Policy,21 and the Substance Abuse Policy.22 Because the Substance
Abuse Policy is mutually agreed upon by both parties and is not in
dispute (in terms of its legality or enforceability),23 it will not be of
focus in this Note. Notably, the other documents provide the
Commissioner the authority to discipline players not only for their
on-field—or work-site—behavior, but also provide the Commissioner the authority to discipline players for their off-field behavior.24
16

Compare id. (stating that fifty-nine players were suspended for off-field conduct),
with 2010 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/finessuspensions/2010/suspensions [https://perma.cc/9LDG-LRLW] (last visited Feb. 26,
2016) (stating that twenty-seven players were suspended in 2010 for off-field conduct),
and 2008 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/finessuspensions/2008/suspensions [https://perma.cc/B5S6-836P] (last visited Feb. 26,
2016) (stating that eleven players were suspended in 2008).
17
See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10.
18
See infra Sections I.C–D.
19
Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League (1970, revised 2006)
[hereinafter NFL Constitution].
20
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10.
21
National Football League Personal Conduct Policy (2014) [hereinafter 2014 PCP].
22
National Football League: Policy and Program of Substance Abuse (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 SAP].
23
See id.; see also Gregg Rosenthal, NFLPA Approves New Drug Policy; HGH Testing
Included, NFL.com (Sept. 16, 2014) http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap30000003935
62/article/nflpa-approves-new-drug-policy-hgh-testing-included/
[https://perma.cc/WU9M-63GG]
24
See, e.g., 2014 PCP, supra note 21 (authorizing the Commissioner to punish players
for domestic violence, among other violent off-the-field crimes).
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Recently, in 2014, former Baltimore Ravens Pro-Bowl running
back Ray Rice was suspended by Commissioner Goodell, due to
Rice’s involvement in a domestic violence altercation with his
then-fiancé.25 In suspending Rice, Commissioner Goodell was acting pursuant to the authority granted to him under the NFL’s 2013
Personal Conduct Policy.26 After video of the altercation surfaced,
the NFL changed his original two-game suspension into an indefinite suspension.27 However, the increased suspension was overturned by an independent arbitrator, who stated that Commissioner Goodell “abuse[d] his discretion” in extending Rice’s punishment based solely on a viewing of the incident.28
Two more cases involving suspensions arising under the 2014
version of the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, which is slightly
different than the 2013 version,29 involved All-Pro running back
Adrian Peterson30 and perennial Pro-Bowler Greg Hardy.31 Peterson’s suspension came on the heels of a legal matter in which Peterson reached a plea-bargain for misdemeanor reckless assault for
25

Ken Belson, Ravens’ Rice Draws 2-Game Suspension from Goodell, N.Y. TIMES (July
24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/sports/football/ray-rice-draws-2-game
-suspension-from-nfl.html [https://perma.cc/EL4B-U79N].
26
See id.
27
Ken Belson, A Punch Is Seen, and a Player Is Out, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/sports/football/ray-rice-video-shows-punch-andraises-new-questions-for-nfl.html [https://perma.cc/9UU3-EEJR].
28
Larry McShane & Gary Myers, Ray Rice Wins Appeal to Overturn NFL Suspension,
Roger Goodell Blasted for Mishandling Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/ray-rice-eligible-play-nfl-suspensionoverturned-article-1.2027036 [https://perma.cc/H9HN-YD7B].
29
In the 2014 version of the Personal Conduct Policy, there is a specified six game
suspension for a first-time violation of any of the listed forms of conduct, and a lifetime
suspension for a second violation of that same conduct. Additionally, the Commissioner,
or a player’s team, is permitted to place a player on the Commissioner’s Exempt List—
paid leave—while an investigation against that player is ongoing. Compare 2014 PCP,
supra note 21, with National Football League Personal Conduct Policy (2013) [hereinafter
2013 PCP].
30
Ryan Wilson, What You Should Know About Adrian Peterson’s Suspension, NFL
Future, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-onfootball/24884058/what-you-should-know-about-adrian-petersons-suspension-nfl-future
[https://perma.cc/K7V3-NBC2].
31
Dan Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspended 10 Games Without Pay, NFL.COM (Apr. 22,
2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000487503/article/greg-hardy-suspend
ed-10-games-without-pay [https://perma.cc/5US8-9CQF].
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the lashing of his four-year old son.32 The Minnesota Vikings, Peterson’s team, initially placed Peterson on the “Commissioner’s
Exempt List,” a feature of the League’s 2014 Personal Conduct
Policy, which is a suspension with pay while his legal dispute was
ongoing.33 After Peterson reached a plea deal in the case, the NFL
suspended him, without pay, for the remainder of the 2014 season.34 In suspending Peterson, the Commissioner was acting pursuant to his authority under the NFL’s 2014 Personal Conduct Policy.35 Relevant to Peterson’s suspension was the fact that pictures
of the victim surfaced, depicting the horrific results of his actions,
and these pictures certainly factored in the resulting suspensions.36
Greg Hardy is alleged to have choked his girlfriend, thrown her
on a futon covered in guns, and threatened her life.37 Hardy was
convicted of misdemeanor assault following a bench trial.38 Under
North Carolina state law, though, someone convicted of a misdemeanor following a bench trial has the right to appeal the conviction to a jury in the state’s superior court.39 On appeal for a jury
trial, Hardy’s case was dismissed after the victim did not show up
32

See Peter King, Peterson’s Punishment, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://mmqb.si.com/2014/11/18/adrian-peterson-suspension-appeal-roger-goodell
[https://perma.cc/K9YH-5V7J].
33
Adrian Peterson Timeline, NFL.COM (Apr. 16, 2015, 9:08 PM), http://www.nfl.com/
news/story/0ap3000000485782/article/adrian-peterson-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/7G
AD-NKH7].
34
See id.
35
See Wilson, supra note 30; see also Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay for
Remainder of 2014 NFL Season, CBSNEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/adrian-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-remainder-of-2014-season
[https://perma.cc/2MHL-LEXE].
36
See Ian O’Connor, Visuals Sealed Adrian Peterson’s Fate, ESPN (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11897549/minnesota-vikings-rb-adrian-petersonwas-done-horrific-visuals-child-abuse-case [https://perma.cc/4TFE-8HWV].
37
See Greg Hardy Case Dismissed After “Paid-Off” Accuser Disappears, N.Y. POST (Feb.
9, 2015, 11:08 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/02/09/greg-hardy-case-dismissed-afterpaid-off-accuser-disappears/ [https://perma.cc/7DLU-AZH5].
38
See Michael Gordon et al., Panthers Greg Hardy Guilty of Assaulting Female,
Communicating
Threats,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(July
15,
2014),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article9140591.html
[https://perma.cc/VG4Y-EL93]; see also Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of
Domestic Violence, USA TODAY (July 15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/2014/07/15/hardy-guilty-on-2-counts-of-domestic-violence/12714103/
[https://perma.cc/4ZAS-HKJ5].
39
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1431(b) (2015).

1058

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1051

to testify.40 The assault charge was based upon the testimony of the
victim, and without the victim’s cooperation, the case did not have
enough evidence to continue.41 Allegedly, an undisclosed monetary
settlement between Hardy and the victim caused the victim to stop
cooperating with the prosecution.42 After the case was dismissed,
Hardy was suspended for ten games by the NFL.43 Hardy appealed
his suspension to an independent arbitrator, in accordance with the
NFL’s CBA, and the suspension was reduced to four games.44
Additionally, suspensions may be imposed on players for their
on-field conduct.45 In 2015, the NFL suspended Tom Brady, the
two-time MVP of the New England Patriots, for his alleged involvement with the under-inflation of footballs, in contravention
with the NFL’s Game Manual.46 Brady was initially suspended by
Commissioner Goodell for four games, and the Commissioner then
upheld the suspension through his authority under Article XLVI47
in the NFL’s CBA.48 In what has become known as “Deflategate,”49 the NFL and Brady have clashed for over a year starting in
January 2015, following a playoff game, when a number of the Pa40

Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of Domestic Violence, supra note 38.
See Glenn Counts & Bora Kim, Judge Dismisses Case Against Greg Hardy, NBC
CHARLOTTE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.wcnc.com/story/news/crime/2015/02/06/
jury-selection-be-complicated-in-greg-hardy-trial/23008195/ [https://perma.cc/63XY4FM8].
42
See Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of Domestic Violence, supra note 38.
43
Hanzus, supra note 31.
44
Dan Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspension Reduced to Four Games, NFL.COM (July 10,
2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000500985/article/greg-hardy-suspen
sion-reduced-to-four-games [https://perma.cc/T3UY-EUTT].
45
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A (stating that the Uniform Player
Contract requires players to abide by an “Integrity of the Game” clause, which may
subject players to punishment for violating that clause); see also infra note 131.
46
Timeline of Events for Deflategate, Tom Brady, ESPN (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timeline-of-eventsfor-deflategate-tom-brady [https://perma.cc/F8A8-ZCMB].
47
Article 46 of the CBA, negotiated between the Players and the Owners, is the section
that grants the Commissioner the power to discipline players for partaking in “conduct
detrimental to the League.” See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
48
See id.; see also Ken Belson, Judge Erases Tom Brady’s Suspension; N.F.L. Says It Will
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/sports/
football/tom-brady-suspension-deflategate.html [https://perma.cc/EL9B-T3AB]; Troy
Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, ESPN (May 12, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/
story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady [https://perma.cc/9BHB-NBJN].
49
See Timeline of Events for Deflategate, Tom Brady, supra note 46.
41
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triots’ footballs were removed at halftime for having air pressure
below the requirement.50 Upon Brady’s appeal to federal district
court, Judge Berman of the Southern District of New York overturned the suspension.51 Brady argued, and the Judge agreed, that
Brady did not have notice of the potential four-game suspension for
the accused conduct, nor did he have access to key witnesses and
to the original report which was the basis for the suspension.52 Following the NFL’s appeal, however, the Second Circuit overturned
Judge Berman’s decision, and reinstated Brady’s four-game suspension.53 The Second Circuit determined that Commissioner
Goodell did not abuse his discretion, and acted within his power
under the CBA.54 The case has been remanded to the District
Court, with instructions to uphold Goodell’s decision to suspend
Brady.55 Brady can file a petition for an en banc review, where the
entire panel of Second Circuit judges will rehear the case—as opposed to the initial three-judge panel—or Brady can file a petition
for the case to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.56 Though a
review of either kind is pretty rare, Brady appears to be gearing up
for another appeal.57
All of the punishment issued to these players invites several
important questions. How is discipline decided, and who is the one
to decide it? How does the Commissioner’s power and discretion
50

See id.
Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Nos.
15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2015).
52
See id. at *11, *16–20.
53
See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 15-2801, 2016 WL 1619883, at *17 (2d Cir. 2016).
54
See id. at *12–17.
55
See id. at *17.
56
See Michael McCann, Tom Brady Faces Long Odds After NFL Wins Deflategate
Appeal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/04/25/tombrady-deflategate-suspension-nfl-appeal-roger-goodell
[https://perma.cc/W33FRKMQ].
57
See id. (stating that less than one percent of Second Circuit en banc petitions are
granted, and roughly one percent of Supreme Court petitions are granted); see also Dan
Graf, Tom Brady Appears to Be Getting Ready for Another Deflategate Appeal, FOX SPORTS
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/tom-brady-new-england-patriotsdeflategate-suspension-appeal-042916 [https://perma.cc/8UZ8-24TJ].
51
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in imposing discipline on players compare to other sports or industries? How does the due process afforded to the players compare to
other sports or industries? What kind of rights do the players have
in challenging their punishment?
Part I of this Note first discusses due process rights provided to
the general population, and then discusses how due process rights
apply in the workplace, specifically in employee discipline. Part I
then analyzes the NFL Commissioner’s power to discipline players, and the players’ due process rights throughout the NFL’s disciplinary process. Additionally, Part I looks at the players’ rights to
appeal disciplinary decisions, and the NFL Commissioner’s power
to review disciplinary decisions under the CBA and Personal Conduct Policy. Part I finishes by comparing the NFL players’ due
process and appeal rights to players in the MLB and the NBA, as
well as to union employees working for Ford Motor Company, and
for the New York City Police Department. Part II addresses the
main conflict presented in this Note, which concerns the adequacy
of the due process rights provided to NFL players in their discipline as compared to the rights of employees in other labor contexts.
Part III proposes a new structure for the NFL’s disciplinary
process, drawing from various concepts and theories utilized by the
NBA, MLB, Ford, and the NYPD. This Note concludes with an
analysis of the pros and cons of the proposed solution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Due Process
1. Generally
Due process is a fundamental protection, not only to the
workplace, but to the country—and its people—as a whole. It is
such a fundamental concept, it is enumerated in two separate
amendments in the Constitution: the Fifth, which prohibits the
federal government from infringing on due process,58 and the Fourteenth, which prohibits the state government from infringing on
due process.59 Though due process is a very complicated concept,
58
59

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
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what it entails is an individual’s right to fairness, both substantively
and procedurally.
The concept of due process is a two-step examination, consisting of both a substantive due process determination, and a procedural due process determination.60 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, states are prohibited from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”61 Courts have interpreted this provision to grant substantive due process rights,
protecting the people in three aspects. First, substantive due
process protects rights explicitly enumerated in the Constitution’s
Bill of Rights;62 second, substantive due process protects the rights
that may not be explicitly listed, but have been deemed fundamental nonetheless;63 and third, substantive due process protects citizens against arbitrary abuses of government power, even where
there is no enumerated or fundamental right being implicated.64
Procedural due process guarantees that when someone’s substantive due process rights are being infringed, he or she must be

60

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (stating that the court must
determine whether there is a protected liberty or property interest and, if so, what
procedures are required).
61
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that a broad
D.C.-wide ban on handguns violated the Second Amendment infringing on substantive
due process).
63
The right to privacy has been viewed as a fundamental right, though ruling certain
interests to be fundamental has come with significant backlash:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced
protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history
counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment,
nor does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any protection
of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary the
boundary of the nuclear family.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
64
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (ruling that the
government action must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and that the means
selected have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained).
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provided sufficient procedures as a remedy.65 Determining the sufficiency of particular procedures requires taking a look at three
separate factors. First, the private interest being affected; second,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and third, the government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.66 After looking at those three factors, a determination
is typically made on whether or not the procedures provided are
sufficient to the harmed party.67
Due process, in general, is an incredibly complex topic. In the
context of this Note, what is most important in the analysis of NFL
player discipline is the ways in which due process affects the
workplace and the due process rights that are typically provided to
employees.
2. Due Process Within Labor
Applying the principles of due process to the workplace can be
tricky when considering that the due process rights provided in the
Constitution are geared to protect people from government interference, not interference from a private party, such as an employer.68
Regardless, due process rights are always provided to public employees, and are provided to private employees when there is a
contractual agreement providing such rights. The rights provided
are typically consistent with those protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.69 Additionally, courts have extended certain
common-law due process rights typically reserved for public em65

See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332–33.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005).
67
See id.
68
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. at amend. V.
69
See JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE & LOCAL EMPLOYMENT
LIABILITY §§ 14:20, 14:23 (Dec. 2015). Although private employers are not required to
provide employees with the same due process rights that public employers are required to
provide, they typically do provide them in collective bargaining agreements after the
Union bargained for them, or as a policy decision to foster Employee-Employer peace. See
Pietro Lynn, Pretermination Hearing Is Not Always Necessary, 2 VT. EMP. L. LETTER, no.
10, 1997, at 1.
66
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ployment70 to private contractual relationships,71 namely, notice of
the pending discipline and a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.72 Courts will extend due process rights into the contractual relationship in an employment setting in two main instances: when an
employee’s economic interests are impacted, or when there is a
wrongful termination claim at stake.73 Courts are reluctant to extend due process rights into the employment relationships though,
as they typically do not want to interfere with the contracts that
private parties enter into.74
In the private labor context, businesses employ either a nonunionized or a unionized workforce.75 In a non-unionized workforce, employment is usually based on individual contracts signed
by employees and is typically “at-will” employment.76 “At-will”
employment simply means that the employee may be fired at any
time or the employee may quit at any time.77 Since the NFL is a
unionized workforce though,78 this Section focuses on the procedural due process rights provided to unionized employees.
When represented by a union, the employees and employer
typically will negotiate a CBA, which dictates various terms of employment.79 One of the terms that is typically addressed in a CBA is
70

Public employment is best categorized as being employed by the government, as
opposed to a private organization. Public Employee Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/public-employee/
[https://perma.cc/WF5P-3YVD]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
71
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 590
(2000).
72
See id.
73
See id. at 589; Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 445–47
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (termination of membership based solely on physician’s previous drug
addiction was arbitrary and capricious, and violated plaintiff’s common law right to fair
procedures).
74
See infra notes 124–29.
75
See The Union Difference, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-AboutUnions/What-Unions-Do/The-Union-Difference [https://perma.cc/WBN3-6EP3] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2016).
76
See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 838 (1995); see also Gary
S. Fealk, At-Will Employment vs. Just Cause Employment, 25 MICH. EMP. L. LETTER, no. 2,
2014, at 3.
77
See Verkerke, supra note 76, at 838.
78
See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10.
79
See Verkerke, supra note 76, at 864–65.
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how employees are to be disciplined.80 Discipline may be further
elaborated in supportive materials, like an employee handbook,
which may further specify certain behavior that will be disciplined,
and the severity of discipline that may be issued based on the employee’s conduct.81
Typically, discipline is handled in unionized workforces under
a “just cause” standard, which means that an employee will only
be disciplined for conduct that constitutes “cause.”82 How
“cause” is determined is usually a subjective determination made
by the disciplinary officer, but may be further specified by materials
such as an employee handbook, as discussed above.83 Having a
“just cause” standard is a crucial right provided to employees, because it safeguards them from being disciplined arbitrarily.84 When
being disciplined for “cause,” employees must also be afforded
procedural due process rights leading up to the disciplinary decision.85
When determining the due process rights provided to employees, there are typically two different aspects that a CBA sets
out: adequate notice of conduct that is subject to discipline, and a
fair hearing for the employee to oppose the pending discipline.86
Adequate notice is a fundamental due process right in employee
discipline, because employees need to know what conduct is going
to be punished, and how it will be punished.87 Additionally, the
employees need to know whether or not certain conduct has been
punished in the past, and if they are currently facing any sort of
discipline for their conduct.88
A fair hearing is also an important procedural due process right
provided to employees because being able to explain the situation
before the disciplining body can be the difference between being
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See id.
See id. at 889–90.
See Fealk, supra note 76.
See generally Verkerke, supra note 76, at 889–90.
Id. at 838.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
See id. at 542–45.
See id. at 546.
See generally id.
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disciplined or not.89 Additionally, by being able to present evidence, or to at least elaborate on exactly what happened, the employee may be able to mitigate the discipline, and have it reduced, if
not completely erased.90
These are two of the more common procedural due process
rights afforded to employees and are two of the more basic rights
that employees are typically provided. Since there are other due
process rights provided to employees,91 it is important to look at
how player and employee discipline has been handled in the past,
and the rights that are currently provided to players in the NFL,
MLB, and NBA, as well as employees in companies like Ford and
organizations like the NYPD.
B. History of Power Granted to Sports Commissioners
The history of the power granted to sports commissioners is a
long one, and one that is not tailored specifically to disciplining
players. Though player discipline is something that all sports
commissioners are empowered to handle, the power to do so first
began in the MLB, and fell under the broad power of the Commissioner to take action in the “best interests” of the League.92 The
“best interests” power was created and implemented in 1921 by
the first Commissioner of MLB, Kenesaw Mountain Landis.93 After the 1919 “Black Sox” scandal, in which members of the White
Sox baseball team had been found to have intentionally thrown a
World Series championship,94 Landis was appointed as the Commissioner of MLB. However, Landis was reluctant to take the job,
and only accepted on the condition that he was provided broad dis-

89

See id. at 542–43.
See id. at 543–44.
91
See infra Sections I.D.1–4.
92
See Matthew L. Winkel, The Not-So-Artful Dodger: The McCourt-Selig Battle and the
Powers of the Commissioner of Baseball, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 539, 540–44 (2013).
93
See id. at 542–44; see also Jonathan M., Reinsdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in
Baseball, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 211, 220–22 (1996); Kenesaw Mountain Landis Bio Page,
BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, http://baseballhall.org/hof/landis-kenesaw [https://perma.cc/
554R-G7HL] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
94
See Reinsdorf, supra note 93, at 219–20.
90
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ciplinary power to protect the “best interests of the game.”95 Since
that initial language was implemented, commissioners in other
sports have utilized the clause during their tenure.96 As former
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig stated, “[T]he intent of the best
interest clause was to protect the integrity of and ensure public
confidence in the game.”97
In Milwaukee American Association v. Landis, the court had to
decide if a Major League team owner, who also owned Minor
League teams, could transfer a player back and forth between his
Major League team and Minor League teams using outright sales
agreements.98 By doing so, and failing to disclose these agreements
to other Major League teams, the owner was able to get around the
waiver process, whereby a different owner could “claim” the player for his team.99 When the owner sought the Commissioner’s approval for a contract with the player, the Commissioner refused to
grant it.100 The team challenged the Commissioner’s power to deny approval for the contract, and the court sided with the Commissioner.101 The court reasoned, “[T]he commissioner is empowered
to investigate upon his own initiative any act . . . charged or alleged
to be detrimental to the best interests of baseball, to determine
what . . . action is appropriate . . . and to take such action against
leagues or clubs as the case may require.”102 In its reasoning, the
court ultimately held that the Commissioner was acting within his
discretionary power in disapproving the player’s contract.103
In 1965, spearheaded by Marvin Miller, a pivotal figure in players’ union history, the first real agreement in the MLB was formed
95

Bukowski, supra note 4, at 109–10 (2001); see also Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks,
From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority,
10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 26 (2008).
96
See, e.g., 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 (prohibiting conduct
“detrimental” to the game, thus protecting its best interests).
97
Matthew A. Foote, Three Strikes and You’re (Not Necessarily) Out: How Baseball’s
Erratic Approach to Conduct Violations Is Not in the Best Interest of the Game, 6 DEPAUL
SPORT L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2009).
98
See Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 300–01 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
99
See id. at 302.
100
See id. at 299–301.
101
See id. at 304.
102
Id. at 302.
103
See id. at 304.
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between the players’ union and the team owners.104 Although it
initially only covered pensions and insurance, two years later Miller
negotiated a full labor agreement, including a formal grievance procedure.105 Building off of the first agreement, Miller was able to argue that the Commissioner was not an “impartial arbitrator” to
decide grievances, and successfully negotiated to have players’
grievances that did not involve violations of the “integrity of the
game” clause to be heard by third party arbitrators in the next
CBA.106 Though this was the first instance of arbitration heard by
an impartial third party, the Commissioner’s “best interests”
power was still in full effect.107
Finley v. Kuhn followed a similar factual narrative as Landis,
where then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn rejected an attempt by one
Major League team to sell three of its players to other Major
League teams.108 Kuhn determined that the attempted maneuver
went against the “best interests” of baseball, and cited his “best
interests” power in refusing to permit the transaction.109 Again, the
court ruled that “[t]he Commissioner has been given broad power . . . to investigate any act . . . not in the best interests of baseball,
to determine what . . . action is appropriate . . . and to take that action. [This includes] the . . . power to . . . disapprove the assignments of players.”110 Ultimately, the court again concluded that
the Commissioner’s broad use of power was permissible given the
facts of the case.111
104

See Michael Macklon, The Rise of Labor Unions in Pro Sports, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 25,
2013),
http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0711/the-rise-of-labor-unions-inpro-sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/86QR-AKG2]; see also Tim Marchman, Marvin Miller:
How the Greatest Union Man in Sports History Shaped the Games We Watch Today, SLATE
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/obit/2012/11/marvin_miller_
dead_how_the_greatest_union_man_in_sports_history_shaped_the.html
[https://perma.cc/S5DM-D2N2].
105
See Michael J. Cozzillio, From the Land of Bondage: The Greening of Major League
Baseball Players and The Major League Baseball Players Association, 41 CATH. U. L. REV.
117, 137 (1991).
106
See id.
107
See generally Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
108
See id. at 531; Benjamin I. Leibovitz, Unnecessary Roughness? A Review of the NFL
Commissioner’s on-the-Field Disciplinary Powers, 20 SPORTS L.J. 187, 195 (2013).
109
See Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 531.
110
Id. at 534.
111
See id. at 539–40.
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The NFL has since adopted a similar provision in its CBA,
where the commissioner may punish players for participating in
conduct that is detrimental to the League.112 This power has generally been upheld when challenged in court.113 This power has usually been upheld because, for a court to hear a case challenging the
commissioner’s power, it has to interpret the CBA itself in order to
determine if the commissioner is acting properly, something courts
are not typically eager to do.114 For example, in 2011, New Orleans
Saints players and coaches were accused of involvement in a
scheme where players were paid under the table for targeting key
opposing players and injuring them; this became known as “Bountygate.”115 Commissioner Goodell suspended four players for their
participation in the scheme, with the suspensions ranging from
three games to a full season. Moreover, the head coach was suspended for a full season, the general manager was suspended for
eight games, the assistant head coach was suspended for six games,
and the defensive coordinator was suspended indefinitely.116 Additionally, Commissioner Goodell fined the organization $500,000
and also made the organization forfeit two second-round draft
picks.117 After the punishments for “Bountygate” were imposed,
one of the suspended players, Jonathan Vilma, challenged the
Commissioner’s power to suspend him by alleging claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.118 The
Commissioner moved to dismiss the two claims, which the court

112

See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
See generally infra Section I.C.
114
See infra notes 122–28.
115
See Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary
Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 92, 105 (2014).
116
The defensive coordinator, Gregg Williams, ended up being suspended for the
remainder of the 2012 season, and was reinstated prior to the start of the 2013 season. See
generally Ryan Wilson, Gregg Williams on Bountygate: It Was “Nothing That Hadn’t Been
Done Before,” CBS SPORTS (July 26, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-onfootball/25250232/gregg-williams-on-bountygate-it-was-nothing-that-hadnt-been-donebefore [https://perma.cc/2W4A-HEFQ].
117
See Jonathan Vilma Banned for Year, ESPN (May 3, 2012), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/7881761/nfl-bans-four-players-new-orleans-saints-bounty-roles
[https://perma.cc/52LV-ELW5].
118
See Vilma v. Goodell, 917 F. Supp. 2d 591, 593 (E.D. La. 2013).
113
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ultimately granted, because the Labor Management Relation Act119
(“LMRA”) prevented the court from interpreting the CBA between the parties.120 In Vilma, the court had to interpret the CBA
to determine if the Commissioner was acting in accordance with
the “conduct detrimental” to the League provision.121 The court
concluded that such an action was not permitted under the
LMRA.122
In hearing a case where an arbitrator has already ruled on the
issue—which is the case in the NFL because an arbitrator oversees
the appeal of player discipline—courts will rarely overturn the decision of an arbitrator, especially when it comes to interpretation of
a CBA.123 The arbitration procedural step is mutually agreed upon,
and labor law’s “private association” principle prevents many
courts from interpreting the private agreements between parties.124
The primary rationale behind this principle is that agreements between private parties should mean something, and should not be
overturned or subject to interference.125 Though courts will typically decline to hear a challenge to a Commissioner’s decision in the

119

Under the LMRA, the power to interpret a CBA in dispute generally belongs to the
agreed upon person as set forth in the disputed CBA. Under the NFL’s CBA, the body
entitled to interpret the application of the CBA is an agreed upon arbitrator. See id. at 593,
595–96.
120
See id. at 595.
121
See id. at 596.
122
See id. at 595–96.
123
See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 504 (2001) (ruling
that the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the arbitrator and decide the case on the
merits was at odds with governing law); E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
531 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (holding that there should be deference to a collectively bargained
arbitrator’s decision in construing or applying a contract); see also Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1960) (stating that the court will only set aside
an arbitrator’s ruling in rare instances).
124
“A most dramatic illustration of this principal occurred in Carr v. St. John’s
University, . . . 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962), where the court refused to interfere with a
university’s decision to expel Catholic students who had participated in a civil marriage
ceremony.” Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, n.38
(1995); see generally Jeffrey A. Durney, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball’s Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 630 (1992); Christopher J. McKinny,
Professional Sports Leagues and the First Amendment: A Closed Marketplace, 13 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 223, 236 (2003).
125
See Stiglitz, supra note 124, at n.38.
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best interests of the sport,126 they will often hear three types of decisions. The first is determining whether the Commissioner acted
in good faith.127 The second is whether the punishment was issued
within the Commissioner’s authority.128 The final is if there is a
challenge to the procedural correctness in the manner that discipline was handled.129
Ultimately, it seems that so long as the parties have agreed to
the terms of their CBA, the “best interests” and “conduct detrimental” clauses grant the commissioner the power to impose discipline and is legally permissible, and will continue to exist in future professional sports’ CBAs.
C. Current Punishment in the NFL
Athletes in the NFL are subject to punishment from multiple
sources. First, the Commissioner has direct authority to discipline
players under the power of the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws
(“NFL Constitution”).130 This power is supported by the NFL’s
CBA,131 and the terms of the Uniform Players’ Contract (“UPC”),
which is found in Appendix A of the 2011 CBA.132 Moreover, re-

126

See infra Sections I.C–D.2.
Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (deciding that
the MLB commissioner had acted in good faith, and looking no further into the
appropriateness of the given punishment).
128
Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (deciding that denying a team a draft choice was outside the scope of the MLB
commissioner’s disciplinary authority).
129
Stiglitz, supra note 124, at 176.
130
See NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII §§ 8.6, 8.13, 8.14.
131
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46; Logan O’Shaughnessy, After Review:
An Open Letter to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell Suggesting that Limiting the League’s
Disciplinary Power Under the Personal Conduct Policy May Be in the League’s Best Interests,
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 527, 530–31 (2011); Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports
League Commissioners’ Authority and Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L.
179, 187–88 (2010).
132
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A. Under the UPC, players can be
punished by the Commissioner in accordance with the “Integrity of the Game”
provision. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A § 15. It states:
Player . . . acknowledges . . . that if he . . . is guilty of any . . . form of
conduct reasonably judged by the League Commissioner to be
detrimental to the League . . . the Commissioner will have the right,
but only after giving Player the opportunity for a hearing . . .
127
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cent developments in the League have given rise to an additional
source of player punishment: the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy,133
which was unilaterally implemented by the NFL.134 The Commissioner has full power to levy fines and/or suspensions, for player
conduct “detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in,
the game of professional football.”135 As a result of these various
documents, the League, and therefore the commissioner, has broad
authority to assign punishment136 for not only player conduct during games, but also off-the-field player behavior as well.137
Adding to the complexity of the NFL’s discipline structure,
players may utilize grievance processes138 in challenging a punishment imposed on them. However, the CBA permits the commissioner to appoint himself as the hearing officer for most forms of
player discipline.139 Ultimately, the commissioner’s power in overseeing these grievances is, like his power to subjectively render the
initial punishment decision, very strong.140

to . . . fine Player in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a
period certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this contract.
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A § 15.
133
The Personal Conduct Policy is a supplemental document to the NFL’s CBA, which
provides examples of conduct which will be punished. It also provides specific
punishments for certain forms of conduct, and provides the Commissioner the power to
suspend a player, with pay, while an investigation against that player is ongoing. See
generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21.
134
See Mike Florio, NFLPA Criticizes “Unilateral” Imposition of Personal Conduct Policy,
NBCSPORTS: PROFOOTBALL TALK (Dec. 10, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2014/12/10/nflpa-criticizes-unilateral-imposition-of-personal-conductpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/K8QS-ZE73].
135
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
136
See, e.g., NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII § 8.13(A).
137
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
138
A grievance process is the process, enumerated in the CBA, by which someone who
is being disciplined under the CBA, may appeal that disciplinary decision. See generally
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10.
139
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a); see also 2014 PCP, supra note 21,
at 7 (“Appeals of any disciplinary decision will be processed pursuant to Article 46 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.”).
140
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a) (stating that the Commissioner
may appoint himself as the hearing officer in any appeal stemming from on-field conduct
or off-field conduct deemed to be detrimental to the League).
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1. Collective Bargaining Agreement & Constitution and
Bylaws
To fully understand the Commissioner’s power at the initial
discipline stage, it is important to start with the current CBA between the Management and the NFL Players Association
(“NFLPA”), in conjunction with the NFL Constitution. The NFL
Constitution and the CBA are two separate documents. While the
NFL Constitution lays out the basic framework for how the League
functions and may be amended from time to time,141 the CBA is
tailored more specifically to various aspects of the League and is
changed as each CBA period expires to provide for negotiations
over disputed issues.142 Although the NFL Constitution grants the
Commissioner the initial power underlying his authority to discipline players for their conduct,143 the CBA elaborates further as to
what conduct the Commissioner is entitled to discipline, and limits
the Commissioner’s power through its negotiation process.144
More applicable to recent punishments,145 the current NFL
CBA (“2011 CBA”), which is the “product of bona fide arm’s
length collective bargaining”146 between the owners and the
NFLPA, was officially entered into on August 4, 2011.147 The 2011
CBA was the end result of the lengthy and contentious bargaining
that went on between the two sides from 2008 to 2011.148
141

See Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner,
7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 47 (2010).
142
See id. at 48.
143
See NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII.
144
See Wilson, supra note 141, at 48.
145
See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
Nos. 15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 2015) (rejecting a defense under Article 46 of the NFL’s current CBA).
146
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at Preamble.
147
See id.
148
After the 2006–2013 CBA had been seen as a “win for the players” due to their
revenue share, the owners opted out of the CBA in 2008. The two sides negotiated for
some time, but could not come to an agreement before the end of the 2010–2011 season.
As a result, the players were locked out, and brought antitrust actions against the League.
After numerous legal issues were resolved, the two sides ultimately came to an
agreement, and formed the 2011 CBA. The major sticking point was how the revenue
would be divided, and though the players ultimately got the share they were seeking, one
of the concessions they made was the power that the Commissioner would retain over
player discipline. See Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis
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Under Article XI of the 2006 CBA, the Commissioner was
permitted to fine or suspend a player for “conduct detrimental to
the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football.”149 The language implemented in that provision is extremely broad, as it could be anything perceived as negative, and is
subjectively determined by the Commissioner.150 Now known as
the Commissioner’s “Article XLVI Power,” Article XVLI of the
2011 CBA adopted the same language used in Article XI of the
2006 CBA in disciplining players “for conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”151 As such, the only added limitation that was placed on the
Commissioner’s power in the 2011 CBA was the amount of money
that the Commissioner could fine players.152
Under the Commissioner’s Article XLVI power, the only due
process rights provided to the player who is disciplined is notice of
the punishment,153 and that a player may only be punished one time
for a particular incident, by either the player’s team or by the
League.154 This “One Penalty” due process right was the focal
point of the Ray Rice case, where Rice’s suspension was overturned after the Commissioner extended it based on later seeing
video of the action.155 There is no requirement for an opportunity
for the player to be heard, though the NFL may conduct their own
of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 14–27 (2012); see generally Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent,
Fumbling Away the Season: Will the Expiration of the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of
the 2011 Season?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1419 (2010).
149
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XI § 1(a) (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NFL
CBA].
150
See id.
151
Compare 2006 NFL CBA, supra note 149, at art. XI § 1(a), with 2011 NFL CBA,
supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
152
Under the 2011 CBA, fines can be challenged as being excessive if they exceed
twenty-five percent of a player’s weekly earnings for the first offense, or fifty percent of a
player’s weekly earnings for a second offense. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art.
46 § 1(d).
153
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
154
See id. at art. 46 § 4.
155
Darren Heitner, Ray Rice Discipline Brings to Light Poorly Drafted NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement, FORBES: SPORTSMONEY (Sept. 11, 2014, 7:52 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/09/11/ray-rice-discipline-brings-tolight-poorly-drafted-nfl-collective-bargaining-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/BAS5LU3U].
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internal investigation into the alleged action that is the subject of
discipline.156 Regardless, because the NFL is a private labor organization, there is no required due process right that they failed to
provide.157 Any obligations to provide certain due process rights, at
least in theory, begin and end with the CBA.158
The players’ grievance process is found under Article XLVI,
similar to the provision that subjects them to the initial discipline.159 For any punishment involving section 1(b) of Article XLVI,
which covers unsportsmanlike conduct or unnecessary roughness
penalties on the field of play,160 the NFL and the NFLPA will jointly select two hearing officers for any players challenging punishment under that section.161 For an appeal of any punishment under
section 1(a), which essentially covers all conduct outside the two
specified instances under section 1(b),162 the commissioner shall
appoint one or more individuals to hear the appeal, after consulting
with the NFLPA.163 Although this may seem like a fair agreement
to hearing an appeal, it comes with a caveat: “[n]otwithstanding
the foregoing, the Commissioner may serve as hearing officer in
any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”164
In adding that provision, the Commissioner is essentially
granted the power to not only issue an initial punishment, but to be
the one to uphold the punishment on appeal.165 Because this appeal
process governs punishments issued pursuant to both the CBA and
the Personal Conduct Policy,166 the Commissioner is granted tremendous power in player punishment.167
156

See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10.
See Charles Bennett, Ray Rice and All Other NFL Players Gave Up Their Due Process
Rights, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), http://sportsagentblog.com/2014/09/09/
ray-rice-and-all-other-nfl-players-gave-up-their-due-process-rights/ [https://perma.cc/
3TXF-FVQ5].
158
See id.
159
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2.
160
Id. at art. 46 § 1(b).
161
See id. at art. 46 § 2(a).
162
Compare id. at art. 46 § 2(a), with id. at art. 46 § 2(b).
163
See id. at art. 46 § 2(a).
164
Id.
165
See id.
166
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a) (stating that the Commissioner
may appoint himself as the hearing officer in any appeal stemming from on-field conduct
157
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Due to the breadth of the Commissioner’s power, it came as no
surprise that the NFLPA was criticized for continuing to allow
such power to be delegated to the Commissioner.168 The Commissioner’s current power continues to enable a situation where the
Commissioner’s discretion is very influential in the determination
of a player’s discipline. As noted though, the Commissioner’s discretionary power has been upheld in federal courts in the past.169
Moreover, both commissioners for other sports and employers imposing discipline over unionized employees in other industries are
accorded similar discretion as well.170
Though courts will typically decline to rule on whether the
Commissioner’s actions are in the best interest of the sport, they
have heard cases in which the Commissioner’s impartiality was
questioned.171 Though players are almost always precluded from
bringing suits against the League, Article III of the 2011 CBA permits legal action where a player is claiming the Commissioner has
breached Articles XVI and XLIII for the player’s right to an “impartial arbitrator.”172 Normally, players are precluded from bringor off-field conduct deemed to be detrimental to the League); see also 2014 PCP, supra
note 21, at 7 (stating that “[a]ppeals of any disciplinary decision will be processed
pursuant to Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement”).
167
See, e.g., 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 7.
168
See Kevin Van Valkenburg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-powergone-too-far-espn-magazine [https://perma.cc/4JML-7Y2W] (“The commissioner’s
power exists, after all, only because it’s granted to him by the NFLPA.”).
169
See, e.g., Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1931)
(upholding baseball Commissioner’s discretionary power to act in the “best interests” of
the game); see also Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir.
1978) (upholding Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s right to determine the best interests of
baseball).
170
See infra Sections I.D.1–4.
171
See infra note 179.
172
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. III.
The NFLPA agrees that neither it nor . . . its members . . . will
sue . . . the NFL . . . provided, however, that nothing contained in this
Section 2 will prevent the NFLPA or any player from asserting
that . . . the NFL, has: (1) breached the terms of this
Agreement . . . and from processing such asserted breach as a noninjury grievance under Article 43 or asserting any claim before the
System Arbitrator or the Impartial Arbitrator as provided in this
Agreement; or (2) breached the terms of the Brady Settlement
Agreement and from asserting such a claim before the System
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ing claims against the League in court, but where they challenge the
hearing officer’s impartiality, they may seek further action in
court.173
Recently, when Tom Brady brought suit against the League, he
did so under Article III’s carve-out provision.174 In having his suspension overturned, Brady provided a huge win for the players’
due process rights. As stated before, the Commissioner’s suspension was overturned because: (1) the NFL provided insufficient
notice to Brady of such a penalty for a potential violation; (2) the
NFL failed to provide Brady with access to key witnesses against
him; and (3) the Commissioner wrongly denied Brady access to the
files that were the basis of his suspension, at his appeal hearing.175
Though notice of the penalty/discipline is an explicit due process
right in the 2011 CBA, the other two grounds for the suspension
reversal are not so clearly enumerated.176 In overturning Brady’s
suspension, Judge Berman emphasized that Brady was denied
access to an impartial arbitrator in his appeal, in accordance with
Article III, and further that Brady was not provided the due process
rights that fairness would dictate.177 In overturning Judge Berman’s
decision though, the Second Circuit rejected this contention, and
established that Commissioner Goodell was within his discretion to
be the hearing officer.178
There have been other instances in which courts have determined a sports commissioner to not be impartial in hearing a player’s appeal. For example, in Morris v. New York Football Giants,
Inc., the court determined that the commissioner could not serve as

Arbitrator, Impartial Arbitrator, or the Appeals Panel, as provided for
in the Brady Settlement Agreement.
Id. at art. III § 2.
173
See id. at art. III § 2.
174
See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
Nos. 15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2015).
175
See id. at *12, *16–20.
176
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
177
See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 2015 WL 5148739, at *20.
178
See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 15-2801, 2016 WL 1619883, at *12–17 (2d Cir. 2016).
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a neutral arbitrator.179 In Morris, two players sought compensation
pursuant to their individual player contracts after they were by
their team.180 Under the terms of their individual contracts with
their team (because at the time, there was no CBA in place), their
actions were brought before the Commissioner, who was to act as
the neutral arbitrator to settle the dispute.181 After the Commissioner decided against the players, the court overturned his decision, holding that based on the underlying facts, the Commissioner
was not neutral.182 Thus, although the court in Morris decided that
the Commissioner was not neutral, the party seeking to vacate the
arbitrator’s award based on such evidence still needs to meet a certain burden in demonstrating that such partiality was present, by
making an adequate showing of prejudice by the arbitrator.183
A recent example of the Commissioner appointing himself as
the hearing officer on appeal after issuing the initial punishment
occurred during the “Bountygate” scandal.184 When the players
appealed their punishment, the Commissioner appointed himself
as the hearing officer, prompting the players to file suit due to his
lack of impartiality.185 After the suit was brought, Commissioner
Goodell decided to delegate the appeal to a hearing officer, pursuant to Article XL of the CBA at the time,186 appointing excommissioner Paul Tagliabue.187 Though the Commissioner ultimately decided to recuse himself, this was still an instance in which
the Commissioner’s decision to appoint himself as the hearing officer raised impartiality concerns.188

179

See Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1016–17 (Cty. S. Ct.
1991).
180
See id. at 1014.
181
See id.
182
See id. at 1016–17.
183
See Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554
(N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that a reasonable person
would have concluded that the panel or arbitrator was partial to defendant).
184
See Pacifici, supra note 115, at 106–07.
185
See id. at 106–10.
186
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a).
187
See Pacifici, supra note 115, at 110–12.
188
See Jeremy R. Abrams, Making the Right Call: Why Fairness Requires Independent
Appeals in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 469, 484–89 (2013).
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As a practical matter, the commissioner cannot serve as the
hearing officer every time a player challenges a punishment under
the CBA or Personal Conduct Policy; there are far too many fines
and suspensions handed out.189 When he does decide to hear appeals though, the impartiality problem naturally arises, as the
Commissioner’s role as the “judge, jury, and executioner”190 may
violate the players’ due process rights.191 Such a situation is problematic because it permits the Commissioner to hear the appeal of
a punishment he initially imposed, which seems to infringe upon
the players’ due process right to have an impartial arbitrator. Although the CBA does afford these players the ability to challenge
the impartiality of the hearing officer in court,192 the judicial
process is a lengthy and costly one, and a process that could be
avoided altogether if the commissioner is not been the person that
hears the appeal in the first place.193
2. Personal Conduct Policy
The NFL’s first Personal Conduct Policy was implemented in
2000, which prohibited a wide variety of off-field violent behavior194 and granted the commissioner exclusive disciplinary author-

189

See 2014 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/finessuspensions/2014 [https://perma.cc/UT79-UGXE] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
190
See Andrew Brandt, Still Judge, Jury, and Executioner, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED:
MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK (Nov. 30, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/
11/30/ray-rice-wins-appeal-roger-goodell-conduct [https://perma.cc/Y262-WT4F].
191
See Ken Belson, Roger Goodell to Hear Tom Brady’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (June 2,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/sports/football/roger-goodell-to-hear-tombradys-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/34SC-JX55]; see also Tony Manfred, The Problem
With Roger Goodell Putting Himself in Charge of Tom Brady’s Suspension Appeal, BUS.
INSIDER (May 15, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/goodell-hearingbrady-appeal-a-problem-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/Z3F4-7JGQ].
192
See supra note 173.
193
For example, the “Deflategate” saga has continued for over one year, and after the
NFL won its appeal in April 2016, Tom Brady appears to want to continue to fight the
ruling. See Dan Graf, supra note 57.
194
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2. Though almost all of the prohibited forms of
conduct in the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy are illegal, therefore justifiably punishable
by the League, there is a prohibition for “[c]onduct that undermines or puts at risk the
integrity of the NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL personnel.” Id. This means that there is a
possibility for being suspended for conduct that may be legal. Id.
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ity for off-field conduct.195 Though the League has not implemented further versions of the policy on an annual basis, they have
revised and added new versions of the policy to address specific
concerns.196 The Personal Conduct Policy provides further elaboration as to what players may be punished for, as well as adds to the
Commissioner’s disciplinary power, acting as a supplement to the
League’s CBA.197
The most recent version of the Personal Conduct Policy was
passed by Commissioner Goodell on December 10, 2014, only one
year after the preceding version of the policy, in response to cases
of domestic violence that some the League’s players were involved
in.198 The 2014 policy was enacted unilaterally by the Commissioner after the owners agreed to it, without any input from the
NFLPA.199 The NFLPA did not take very kindly to the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy because they were not involved in its enactment.200 This raised legitimate questions as to whether the policy’s
implementation was proper, not only under the NFL’s CBA,201 but
also under fundamental labor law principles governing unilateral
action taken by an employer.202 Here, however, the Commissioner
195

See Kelly M. Vaughan, First and Goal: How the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy
Complies with Federal Antitrust Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 614 (2011).
196
For example, the League implemented a new policy in 2008 where it extended
potential suspension lengths for violations, and permitted discipline even where a player
was not convicted of a crime. See id.
197
See generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21.
198
See generally id.; 2013 PCP, supra note 29.
199
See Tom Pelissero, NFL Owners Pass New Personal Conduct Policy, USA TODAY
(Dec. 10, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/12/10/
roger-goodell-nfl-owners-personal-conduct-policy/20199033/ [https://perma.cc/8G8MPMPE].
200
See Michael O’Keeffe, NFL Players Union Files Grievance vs. NFL over New Personal
Conduct Policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2015) http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/
football/nflpa-files-grievance-nfl-new-conduct-policy-article-1.2089402
[https://perma.cc/T2BB-2MJH].
201
See Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion Is Too Much for the NFL
Commissioner to Have over the Players’ Off-the-Field Conduct?, 17 SPORTS L.J. 167, 180–81
(2010).
202
For example, under section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, an employer is
required to “confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms of
conditions of employment.” National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(2016); see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 746–47 (1962) (holding that the duty to bargain
between management and a union extends to the terms explicitly listed under § 8(d)). But
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claimed to have enacted the new policy “pursuant to [his] authority under the Constitution and Bylaws,”203 though the CBA does
not grant him the express power to enact policies such as the Personal Conduct Policy. In fact, the CBA “supersede[s] any conflicting provisions in . . . the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, the NFL
Rules, or any other document affecting terms and conditions of
employment of NFL players.”204 Moreover, though the NFLPA
challenged the NFL’s implementation of the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy as a “document affecting terms and conditions of employment” and argued that it should be superseded by the CBA,
their non-injury grievance to a third-party arbitrator remains unresolved to this point.205 Opposing the new policy, however, might
not end well for either side, as domestic violence has been a major
problem for the League,206 and this policy was a serious effort in
order to combat it.207 Though it may be argued that a full revision
of the Personal Conduct Policy is not necessary, and is instead just
a revision to address the domestic violence problem, the new policy
adds more than merely a domestic violence provision.208
The 2014 version provides even more disciplinary control to
the League than the 2013 version, as players may be placed on the
“Commissioner Exempt List”—which allows leave with pay—
while an investigation is ongoing.209 This sort of power usually does
see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958) (holding that
not every action taken by an employer must be bargained over).
203
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 1.
204
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. II § 1.
205
See Tom Pelissero, NFL, NFLPA Reach Settlement on Contempt Motion in Adrian
Peterson Case, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2015, 9:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/vikings/2015/09/25/nfl-nflpa-adrian-peterson-case-dismiss-civil-contemptmotion/72837158/ [https://perma.cc/LUH4-YVFS].
206
Benjamin Morris, The Rate of Domestic Violence Arrests Among NFL Players,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 31, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/therate-of-domestic-violence-arrests-among-nfl-players/ [https://perma.cc/T6KX-8L2T].
207
See id.; see also Josh Levs, NFL Toughens Policy Addressing Assault and Domestic
Violence, CNN (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/us/nflconduct/ [https://perma.cc/4HT9-3F6J].
208
See generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21.
209
See Ken Belson, N.F.L. Sets Strict Rules for Actions Off Field, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/sports/football/roger-goodell-wont-assesspenalties-under-revised-conduct-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/EXN9-E8WV];
see
generally 2013 PCP, supra note 29.
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not exist in other comparable sports, or industries.210 Additionally,
the 2014 policy directly addresses the domestic violence issue that
plagued the League.211 The revised 2014 Personal Conduct Policy
explicitly lists domestic violence, as well as other violent crimes, as
conduct which will be disciplined, unlike previous personal conduct policies.212 Under the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy, there is a
prescribed six-game suspension for a first offense of one of the
listed examples, with consideration given to aggravating or mitigating factors in increasing or decreasing the suspension.213 The policy
lists other types of violations or potential “detrimental” acts214 that
would warrant such discipline, but does not limit the potential violations to that specific list.215 The 2014 policy also addresses a potential repeat offender, with a lifetime banishment penalty for
someone who commits a second violation of one of the specified
acts.216 A player who has received a lifetime banishment may petition the Commissioner for reinstatement after one year.217
210

See infra Sections I.D.1–3.
See generally Levs, supra note 207.
212
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2.
213
Id. at 6.
214
That list includes:
Actual or threatened physical violence against another person,
including dating violence, domestic violence, child abuse, and other
forms of family violence; Assault and/or battery, including sexual
assault or other sex offenses; Violent or threatening behavior toward
another employee or a third party in any workplace setting; Stalking,
harassment, or similar forms of intimidation; Illegal possession of a
gun or other weapon (such as explosives, toxic substances, and the
like), or possession of a gun or other weapon in any workplace setting;
Illegal possession, use, or distribution of alcohol or drugs; Possession,
use, or distribution of steroids or other performance enhancing
substances; Crimes involving cruelty to animals as defined by state or
federal law; Crimes of dishonesty such as blackmail, extortion, fraud,
money laundering, or racketeering; Theft-related crimes such as
burglary, robbery, or larceny; Disorderly conduct; Crimes against law
enforcement, such as obstruction, resisting arrest, or harming a police
officer or other law enforcement officer; Conduct that poses a
genuine danger to the safety and well-being of another person; and
Conduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity of the NFL,
NFL clubs, or NFL personnel.
2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis added).
215
See id.
216
See id.
217
See id.
211
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In terms of its language, the new 2014 Personal Conduct Policy
uses the same punishment for “conduct detrimental” language
that is included in the Commissioner’s Article XLVI power.218 Additionally, the Policy does not limit discipline to players who are
convicted of a proscribed violation;219 a mere accusation is enough
to warrant a fine or suspension.220
The 2014 Policy appears, on its face, to restrict the Commissioner’s power to discipline players for “conduct detrimental.”221
Although an initial disciplinary decision is “made or recommended
by a disciplinary officer,” the decision is made under the delegated
authority of the Commissioner.222 Additionally, the 2014 Policy
does not provide much of a limitation on the Commissioner’s power at the player grievance stage.
Players challenging any discipline imposed on them under the
Personal Conduct Policy must follow the same procedures that are
set forth under Article XLVI of the CBA.223 Since the Commissioner retains the power to discipline players under the Personal
Conduct Policy, his ability to hear the appeal presents a similar issue of impartiality as an arbitrator, and whether this infringes on
the due process rights of the players.224 Although courts will typically defer to the contracts made between unions and Management,
when there is clear partiality in the appeal process they may decide
to overturn the appeal decision and have it re-heard.225 As discussed above, players may challenge the commissioner’s neutrality
218

Compare 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 1, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46
§ 1(a).
219
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2; Bethany Withers, The Integrity of the Game:
Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 174–76
(2010) (noting examples where players have been disciplined by the League and
subsequently been found not guilty of criminal charges).
220
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2.
221
See id. at 1, 5 (“Everyone who is part of the league must refrain from ‘conduct
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in’ the NFL . . . . You have violated
this policy . . . if the evidence gathered by the league’s investigation demonstrates that
you engaged in conduct prohibited by the Personal Conduct Policy.”).
222
Id. at 6.
223
See supra note 163.
224
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46.
225
See Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554
(N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that a reasonable person
would have concluded that the panel or arbitrator was partial to defendant).
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in hearing the appeal under Article III when they feel they aren’t
being provided their right under the CBA to an impartial arbitrator
under Articles XVI and XLIII.226
Whether the various avenues of discipline and the due process
and appeal rights the players have throughout the process conform
to what is expected in normal labor contexts is a complicated issue.
In order to make such a determination, it is crucial to look at how
discipline, and the rights of employees, or players, in other contexts
is handled.
D. Punishment in Other Contexts
1. Major League Baseball
In MLB, the Commissioner’s power to discipline players at the
initial stage lies in its Constitution and Bylaws,227 its CBA,228 and
the recently enacted Domestic Violence Policy.229 In the CBA, the
Commissioner’s power is explicitly laid out under Article XII and
is similarly worded as the current CBA in the NFL.230 Under Article XII, the Commissioner may discipline “[p]layers . . . for just
cause for conduct that is materially detrimental or materially prejudicial to the best interests of Baseball . . . .”231 The CBA then
provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would
fall under this “best interests” clause.232 Although the “best interests” clause is a broad grant of power, it does come with some limitations, as compared to the NFL.233 Although both CBAs have a
notice requirement to the disciplined player, the NFL is not required to have the same investigation step prior to issuing discip-

226

See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. III.
Major League Baseball Constitution (2005) [hereinafter MLB Constitution].
228
2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8.
229
MLB Joint Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, and Child Abuse Policy (2015)
[hereinafter MLB DAP].
230
Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra
note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
231
2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B.
232
See id.
233
Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note
10, at art. 46.
227
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line as the MLB.234 Additionally, the MLB’s grievance procedure,
as discussed below, provides a greater limitation on MLB commissioner powers than the NFL provides.
The broad grant of the “best interests” power can be problematic though. Although Article XII prohibits “conduct in violation
of federal, state or local law,”235 players may be disciplined for other bad—albeit legal—behavior, as well. For example, John Rocker
was suspended by then-Commissioner Bud Selig in 2000 after a
racist rant Sports Illustrated, when asked if he would ever play for
the New York Mets.236 Rocker’s suspension marked the first time a
player had been disciplined for speech.237 Though inflammatory,
Rocker’s conduct did not fall under the “in violation of federal,
state or local law” language, thus, the decision to discipline was
made pursuant to the “best interests” clause. Although a player
probably understands that making racist remarks will likely damage
his own public image, it is perhaps not as easy for that player to see
how his words would cause damage to the entire sport. Indeed, as
Rocker was the first to be disciplined for this behavior, players may
not always know what actually constitutes conduct that is detrimental to baseball’s “best interests.”
Possible solutions to rectify the vagueness of the “best interests” clause are also problematic. For example, due to the unpredictable nature of player conduct, instituting an exhaustive list of
all possible violations is not feasible. Moreover, leaving discipline
power to individual franchise owners would likely create even more
ambiguity, as discipline would be imposed on a team-by-team basis,
rather than league-wide. By granting power to the Commissioner,
in theory, the Commissioner would be looking towards balancing
punishment with the best interests of the entire league. “[T]he ra234
Under MLB’s CBA, the League is required to conduct an investigation into a
potential misconduct violation before imposing discipline; the NFL does not have such a
requirement. Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII §§ C, D; with 2011 NFL
CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46.
235
2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B.
236
See Leibovitz, supra note 108, at 199; see also Murray Chass, Baseball Suspends Rocker
Till May for Comments, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
02/01/sports/baseball-baseball-suspends-rocker-till-may-for-comments.html
[https://perma.cc/7F7W-45HJ].
237
See Chass, supra note 236.
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tionale behind granting the Commissioner the power to overrule
the owners lies in a fundamental conflict of interest for the owners,
whose financial incentives are not wholly attached to the success of
MLB, but also to the success of their individual teams.”238 Despite
the potential confusion over what conduct would be prohibited due
to the breadth of Commissioner power, the power has been upheld
by federal courts.239
More recently, the MLB decided to enact a Domestic Violence
Policy, granting the Commissioner additional power that is not
contained in either the Constitution or CBA. The MLB’s recent
implementation of the Domestic Violence Policy can be traced to
the NFL’s decision to do so.240 Domestic violence is a serious issue
in the MLB, and the League is doing whatever it can to curtail such
behavior.241 Under the Domestic Violence Policy, the Commissioner enjoys a tremendous amount of discretionary power in rendering a disciplinary decision.242 By the policy’s own terms, “the
Commissioner can issue the discipline he believes is appropriate in
light of the severity of the conduct.”243 Further, the Commissioner
may suspend the player up to seven days while conducting an investigation into the matter, and may even suspend the player, with
pay, prior to the conclusion of any legal proceeding.244 Under the
policy, the Commissioner retains the exclusive power to discipline
players, though he may defer to the player’s respective team to impose punishment.245 Lastly, similar to the NFL’s Personal Conduct
238

Craig F. Arcella, Major League Baseball’s Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial
Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2420, 2424 (1997).
239
See generally Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931); see also
Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s right to determine the best interests of baseball).
240
See David Lennon, MLB Learns From NFL’s Mistake, Implementing Domestic Violence
Education Program, NEWSDAY (Feb. 28, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.newsday.com/
sports/columnists/david-lennon/mlb-learns-from-nfl-s-mistake-implementing-domesticviolence-education-program-1.9990592 [https://perma.cc/58VY-JAKU].
241
See Mike Bates, MLB’s Record on Domestic Violence Worse Than NFL’s, SBNATION
(July 28, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/7/28/5936835/ray-ricechuck-knoblauch-minnesota-twins-mlb-domestic-abuse-violence [https://perma.cc/R6
SR-EMF6].
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243
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244
See id. § B.
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Policy, the player does not need to be convicted.246 Aroldis Chapman, pitcher for the New York Yankees, was the first player suspended under this new policy, for 30 games on March 1, 2016.247
The MLB and NFL disciplinary structures are very similar in
terms of how initial punishment is handled. Under the CBA, the
MLB’s power to discipline players to protect the “best interests”
of baseball is similar to the NFL’s power to discipline players for
“conduct detrimental” to the League.248 Under both clauses, players can be disciplined on a subjective determination made by the
Commissioner. Since the MLB laid the ground work for Commissioner power,249 it seems that the NFL modeled their Commissioner’s power after the MLB. Moreover, in each sport, in addition
to the power granted to each Commissioner under their respective
CBAs, there are additional sources that provide the Commissioners
with the ability to levy punishment to discipline players.250
Notably, the MLB’s recent Domestic Violence Policy provides
the MLB Commissioner with slightly more discretionary power
than does the NFL’s. In the MLB’s Domestic Violence Policy,
there are no maximum or minimum limitations to the discipline
that may be imposed on a player.251 In the NFL’s new Personal
Conduct Policy, the Commissioner can issue a baseline, six-game
suspension on the first violation, and a lifetime ban for a subsequent domestic violence violation.252 Under the MLB’s policy, the
Commissioner may issue a lifetime ban immediately, if the situa246

See id.
Paul Hagen & Bryan Hoch, Chapman Gets 30-Game Suspension from MLB, MLB.COM
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/165860226/yankees-aroldis-chapmansuspended-30-games [https://perma.cc/HF6Q-5DV5]. Jose Reyes, the Colorado
Rockies’ shortstop, was also involved in a domestic violence dispute, and though charges
were dropped, he was placed on paid leave February 23, 2016, not to be reinstated until
May 31, 2016; missing fifty-one games. See Andrew Joseph, Jose Reyes Returns to Rockies,
Vows to Be “A Better Man, A Better Husband,” USA TODAY (May 19, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2016/05/19/jose-reyes-returns-rockiesvows-better-man-better-husband/84598918/ [https://perma.cc/KB3V-CH7X].
248
Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note
10, at art. 46.
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See supra note 98.
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tion were to warrant it. On the other hand, where a six-game suspension in the NFL may not be appropriate in all instances, the
MLB may impose a lesser suspension in those situations. Though
the NFL’s Commissioner may take into account any mitigating or
aggravating factors to better fit punishment, he must start with the
prescribed six game or lifetime ban before doing so.253 In the MLB,
such a starting point is not necessary, so the MLB’s Commissioner
may have a better starting point for a minor or severe violations.254
The grievance procedures in MLB are unique to each source of
punishment power. Under the CBA, players can challenge punishment stemming from their on-field conduct, or for all other
grievances, including off-field conduct.255 For discipline taken
against a player stemming from an on-field incident, such as fighting or interfering with an umpire, a grievance would be heard in
front of the Executive Vice President, Administration, or the
Commissioner himself.256 The grievance procedure for any other
appeal is different from the procedure for on-field conduct discipline.257 Under this sort of grievance filing, the grievance must first
be brought up to the player’s club, then to the League’s Labor Relations Department, before finally being heard in front of an arbitration panel.258 The arbitration panel is formed by each party selecting one arbitrator, and then agreeing on an “impartial” third arbitrator.259 If the parties cannot agree on a third, “impartial” arbitrator, then a list from the American Arbitration Association is provided until the parties narrow the list down to one.260 The third
impartial arbitrator may be fired by either party, so long as they are
not handling a case at the time.261 Notably, the CBA does not grant
the Commissioner authority to appoint himself as the arbitrator to

253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

See id.
See MLB DAP, supra note 229.
See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI §§ B–C.
See id. at art. XI § C(1)(a)–(b).
See id. at art. XI § B.
See id.
See id. at art. XI § A(9).
See id.
See id.
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hear an appeal filed for off-field conduct, as compared to the
NFL.262
Under the MLB’s new Domestic Violence policy, the same
three-person arbitration panel is used in hearing a player’s grievance over punishment issued.263 Because there are no maximum or
minimum limitations to the Commissioner’s discipline, the panel
uses a “just cause” standard, where the punishment must reflect
the “cause,” or severity of the violation.264 The arbitration panel
may also, on their own, weigh the various aggravating and mitigating factors that played a role in the punishment determination.265
In comparison to the NFL, the MLB grievance procedures do
not permit the Commissioner to hear appeals for off-field discipline. These types of appeals are heard in front of a three-member
arbitration panel, where each party gets to select an arbitrator, before agreeing upon the third.266 In the NFL, the Commissioner may
hear the appeal himself, and when he does appoint a hearing officer, the Commissioner merely has to consult with the NFLPA Executive Director prior to appointing a hearing officer.267 The
NFLPA does not get to choose one of the hearing officers, meaning
the Commissioner has the exclusive power to determine who will
hear the case.268 The MLB, on the other hand, grants more power
to the players in the appeal process, in terms of determining who
will be hearing the appeal.
2. National Basketball Association
Unlike the NFL or the MLB, the NBA’s commissioner power
to discipline at the initial stage is derived only from the NBA’s
Constitution and Bylaws, and is limited by its CBA.269 Under the
NBA’s Constitution and Bylaws, the Commissioner may discipline
a player “for any statement he makes or endorses which is prejudi262

See id. at art. XI.
See MLB DAP, supra note 229, at § C.
264
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See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI § A(9).
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Constitution].
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cial or detrimental to the best interests of basketball and to suspend
or fine the player for conduct that is detrimental to the NBA.”270
Further, the Commissioner has the power to discipline players for
being “guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of morality and fair play.”271
Under the language of the NBA’s Constitution and Bylaws, the
Commissioner is accorded the same discretionary power in issuing
punishment to a player as the MLB and NFL.272 The Latrell Sprewell incident in the late 1990s was an example of how arbitrators
and courts treat the NBA Commissioner’s power under the Constitution and Bylaws, and the CBA.273 In 1997, Latrell Sprewell, a
then-NBA player, physically assaulted his coach P.J. Carlesimo, to
the point of choking him with his bare hands.274 David Stern, the
NBA Commissioner at the time, suspended Sprewell for a full calendar year following the incident, pursuant to his authority under
the Constitution’s “best interests” clause.275 On appeal, the
Grievance Arbitrator reduced the discipline issued by the Commissioner, after determining that reducing the suspension to the remainder of the season was more fair.276 The court upheld the arbitrator’s ruling when Sprewell brought suit to have the arbitration
award vacated.277 This case was crucial in defining the modern day
limitations on the NBA’s Commissioner power to discipline players.
Much like the MLB Commissioner’s disciplinary power, the
NBA’s Commissioner has similar discretionary power to discipline
players as the NFL’s Commissioner. The NBA has the same “best
interests” clause implemented in its Constitution that the MLB
270

Robert I. Lockwood, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings
Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in the NBA, 15
SPORTS L.J. 137, 151 (2008); see NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d)(i).
271
NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d).
272
Compare id. at art. 35 §§ (c)–(d), with 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B,
and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
273
See generally Roger A. Javier, You Cannot Choke Your Boss & Hold Your Job Unless
You Play in the NBA: The Latrell Sprewell Incident Undermines Disciplinary Authority in the
NBA, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 209, 210–12 (2000).
274
See id. at 211.
275
Lockwood, supra note 270, at 153–54.
276
See id. at 155.
277
See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 986–88 (9th Cir. 2001).
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has in its CBA, and this “best interests” clause, as discussed
above, functions in a similar way that the NFL’s “conduct detrimental” to the League clause functions.278 Although the NBA does
not have separate documents specifically for domestic violence or
drug use prevention, as the MLB and NFL do, punishment under
the “best interests” clause has come with stricter scrutiny on appeal.279
Prior to the Sprewell case, the NBA Commissioner’s decision
over player punishment was not heavily scrutinized by an arbitrator. Although history has supported a Commissioner’s ability to act
within a broad discretionary range of power in order to protect the
best interests of their respective League, the overturning of Sprewell’s suspension set a fair and reasonable standard on the discipline imposed by the NBA Commissioner. This is not to say NBA
Commissioners have acted egregiously in the past, it simply means
their punishment decisions are to be analyzed more critically upon
appeal.
The grievance procedures accorded to players under the
NBA’s CBA is different from the analogous MLB and NFL procedures.280 The NBA uses a Grievance Arbitrator and a Player Discipline Arbitrator.281 A System Arbitrator handles disputes primarily arising out of salary or contract disputes between the Player and
his team, and is thus not central to the topic of discipline.282
Whether a discipline appeal goes to the Grievance Arbitrator or
the Player Discipline Arbitrator depends on the severity of the discipline.283 If the discipline is a fine of less than $50,000, a suspension less than twelve games, or a combination of the two, then the
278

Compare NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d)(i), with 2012 MLB CBA,
supra note 8, at art. XII § B, and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a).
279
See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 986–88.
280
Compare NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXI § 9 (2011) [hereinafter
NBA CBA], with 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI, and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note
10, at arts. 43–44 § 2(a).
281
See NBA CBA, supra note 280, at art. XXXI §§ 1(a)(i), 9(a); see also Jeffrey A.
Mishkin, Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The Allocation of Decision Making Among the
Commissioner, Impartial Arbitrator, System Arbitrator, and the Courts, 35 VAL. U. L. REV.
449, 453–58 (2001).
282
See NBA CBA, supra note 280, at art. XXXII § 1.
283
See id. at art. XXXI § 9.
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player must first appeal to the Commissioner.284 After the Commissioner hears the appeal and renders a decision, the player may
then file a subsequent appeal to the Player Discipline Arbitrator,
whose decision is final and binding.285 The Player Discipline Arbitrator is a single person, with NBA experience (ex-player, coach,
front office executive, etc.), and is agreed upon by both sides.286
Either side may terminate him through a written submission during
the period of November 1 through December 1, each year of the
CBA’s duration.287 The procedure of the initial Commissioner
hearing, followed by an appeal to the Player Discipline Arbitrator,
is also used for discipline imposed due to in-game conduct.288
If, however, the suspension is more than twelve games, or the
fine exceeds $50,000, then the appeal goes to the Grievance Arbitrator.289 The Grievance Arbitrator, as used in the Sprewell incident, is decided at the outset of the CBA and is a single person
agreed upon by both the NBAPA and the owners.290 The Grievance Arbitrator remains in that position for the duration of the
CBA;291 however, there is a six day window from July 27 until August 1 each year in which either party may remove the Grievance
Arbitrator, or the Grievance Arbitrator may step down on his
own.292 The Grievance Arbitrator handles the appeal of off-court
discipline and on-court discipline that is a fine in excess of $50,000
or a suspension in excess of twelve games.293
The NBA’s grievance process somewhat resembles a combination of the NFL and MLB grievance procedures. In the NFL, the
Commissioner has the discretion to appoint himself to hear the appeal for just about any case that he wants to.294 In the MLB, the
Commissioner never has the right to hear an appeal following a dis284
285
286
287
288
289
290
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292
293
294

See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(1)–(5).
See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(a)–(f).
See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(d).
See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(e).
See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a).
See id. at art. XXXI § 9(b).
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See id.
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See id. at art. XXXI § 9(b).
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
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ciplinary decision that he made.295 Here, the Commissioner does
have the authority to hear an appeal following his own disciplinary
decision, but only for smaller punishments that are issued.296 Additionally, even when the NBA’s Commissioner hears an appeal for a
small punishment, the Commissioner’s decision can be appealed
further to the Player Discipline Arbitrator,297 which is not a possibility in the NFL’s appeal structure.298 Drawing a distinction between what constitutes on-court or off-court behavior is not always
clear, though.
In the infamous melee that took place at the Palace of Auburn
Hills in Detroit, the Detroit Pistons and Indiana Pacers got into a
huge fight that has come to be known as the “Malice in the Palace.”299 After Ben Wallace was fouled by Ron Artest, players from
both teams got into a skirmish on the court.300 The fight spilled into the crowd, and after a fan threw a beer at Artest, he went into
the stands to fight the fan.301 Following the fight, three players that
were suspended subsequently filed appeals, and though the fight
transpired on the court, the Grievance Arbitrator heard the appeal.302 The Commissioner believed that he should be the one to
hear the appeal, because the fight took place on the court, or ingame.303 After the Arbitrator reduced Jermaine O’Neal’s suspension from twenty-five to fifteen games,304 Commissioner Stern
brought suit and continued to argue that the discipline was issued
for conduct that occurred on the court, and was thus under his exclusive jurisdiction.305 The judge sided with the arbitrator though,
295
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and reasoned that the conduct was so external to the game that it
could not possibly have been contemplated as constituting conduct
“on the playing court.”306 The court stated that fighting with a
spectator, which O’Neal was involved in, “has never been characterized as conduct on the playing court.”307 Ultimately, the court
affirmed the arbitrator’s reduction to O’Neal’s suspension.308
Comparing the NFL Commissioner’s discretionary authority
to other sports entire disciplinary process is useful to gauge its appropriateness. Comparing the power to other industries, however,
will shed even more light on what kind of power is appropriate in
disciplining employees.
3. United Auto Workers’ Union–Ford Motor Company
It is important to compare the NFL’s disciplinary system to
another industry, here the auto industry, to bring a different perspective as to how unionized employees, outside of the sports context, are disciplined by their superiors. In order to compare the
NFL to the auto industry, the agreement between the United Automobile Workers Union (“UAW”) and Ford Motor Company
will be examined. The UAW is one of the primary labor organizations representing employees in the auto industry,309 while Ford is
one of the most historically successful automobile companies.310
Looking at how Ford employees can be disciplined will display a
pretty good idea as to how the auto industry deals with employee
discipline.
In the UAW–Ford CBA, the power authorized to the employer, or supervisor in this instance, can be found in the Discipline and
Discharge section located under Company Responsibility.311 That
section states “[t]he Company retains the sole right to discipline
306

See id. at *10–11.
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and discharge employees for cause, provided that in the exercise of
this right it will not act wrongfully or unjustly or in violation of the
terms of this Agreement.”312 The section then goes on to say that
any prior violations that took place more than two years ago are not
counted in assessing the appropriate discipline.313 However, the
CBA never really provides a more elaborate definition of what
should constitute “cause” for discipline.314 The Company Responsibility section also provides for an opportunity to discuss the potential discipline between the employer and employee, presumably
to give the employee a chance to defend himself before discipline is
imposed.315
Ford’s Code of Conduct offers more examples of types of
workplace behavior could warrant disciplinary measures.316 Some
of the workplace behavior that could be disciplined are: discriminatory hiring practices,317 any form of harassment in the workplace,318
health and safety violations,319 and violation of the substance abuse
policy.320 Under each of these sections in the handbook, there are
no set guidelines as to what punishment could be, where any violation of the handbook would subject the employee to discretionary
punishment.321 The language that is used to give any guidance as to
what the punishment could be is that “Violation . . . may result in
discipline, up to and including termination or release.”322
Recently, in a Ford plant in Chicago, a female employee filed a
civil suit against the company because she had been sexually harassed in the workplace.323 Ford responded to this suit by terminat312
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ing several of the employees who had allegedly been a part of the
harassment.324 Although Ford did not disclose the amount of employees who had been part of the harassment, it stated that the
plant manager had been moved to Canada.325 As the woman had
apparently filed complaints in the past, and nothing had been done
to curb the behavior, this would fall within the company’s handbook under the “Anti-Harassment” section.326 Under that section,
turning a blind eye to an employee’s harassment complaint would
constitute a violation.327
In terms of outside the workplace behavior, such as committing
a crime, the CBA and company handbook do not provide explicit
information. It seems that an employee’s supervisor has the discretion to determine if an employee’s out-of-work behavior would fall
within the “for cause” standard that is located in the CBA.
By not providing further clarity regarding what constitutes
“cause” for discipline, the CBA is fairly ambiguous. If employees
behave in some manner for a period of time and no disciplinary action is taken, then it would be difficult to punish an employee in the
future for behaving the same way—even if the behavior is undesirable. The punished employee would point to the lack of discipline
issued in the past for that same behavior, providing a rather strong
argument against the presence of “cause.”328 This is likely a customary practice, because trying to enumerate a complete list of examples of “cause” may not be feasible. Employee behavior is unpredictable, and trying to enumerate every possible example of
something that would justify “cause” is not practical. Where an
employee challenges discipline after an initial determination of
“cause,” employees can take advantage of a formal grievance procedure.329
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Ultimately, the initial discipline structure in the UAW–Ford
relationship is similar to the NFL’s in multiple ways. To start, both
have a requirement before punishment is warranted; the UAW only permits punishment “for cause” and the NFL only permits punishment for “conduct detrimental” to the League.330 Although
both standards are broad, the NFL and Ford both provide further
elaboration as to what would fall under each respective standard.
At Ford, the company provides the employee guidebook, which
sets out specific conduct that may be punished.331 The NFL has a
Personal Conduct Policy that, although separate from the CBA
(much like Ford’s employee conduct guide), further elaborates certain forms of conduct that would justify punishment.332
Ford employees may challenge disciplinary action taken against
them pursuant to section 2’s “Disciplinary Cases” under Article
VIII.333 After being disciplined, a notice of the discipline is sent to
an employee’s “Unit Committeeperson.”334 The Unit Committee
consists of three to four people, and they represent an employee
during a first stage grievance hearing.335 A first stage grievance
hearing is essentially an informal meeting between the employee
and the employer to settle the grievance, if possible.336 In a disciplinary grievance action though, a hearing prior to the discipline taking effect is held, where the employee and his Unit Committee representative are typically present.337 In challenging an imposed discipline following the hearing, the employee’s grievance proceeds to
Stage Two of the grievance procedure.338
At Stage Two, a formal written account of the disciplinary action is presented to the company’s representative prior to a weekly
held grievance meeting.339 The company representative will inform
the Unit Committee chairperson the decision of any of the griev330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
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ances that were brought before him after no later than one week.340
If the decision of the company’s representative does not satisfy either the Unit Committee or the employee, either may pursue further action at the Third Stage.341
At the Third Stage, the Unit Committee Chairperson writes a
formal, and detailed, account and appeal to the Plant Review
Board.342 The Plant Review Board for a multi-unit plant consists of
at least two members on behalf of the Unit and at least two members on behalf of the company.343 The Plant Review Board, ultimately renders a decision on behalf of the company, even though
the Unit does have a voice in the matter.344
In the final stage, the grievance is appealed to an impartial
“Umpire,” who is agreed upon by both sides.345 In order to have a
grievance appear before the Umpire, the National Ford Department of the International Union has to appeal the third stage decision.346 The Umpire may not hear every appeal that is set before
him though, such as matters within company discretion.347 Ultimately, when the Umpire does hear and rule on a grievance, the
decision is final and binding,348 and the union is required to not encourage or accompany a member in pursuing an appeal of the Umpire’s ruling to court.349
The grievance procedure set forth in the CBA between UAW
and Ford seems to provide a more detailed avenue for a grievance
to be processed than the NFL’s. For example, there are more steps
that an employee can go through before having to resort to bringing
suit in court, where the determinations of the arbitrator, or possibly
Commissioner in the NFL’s case, are almost always upheld.350
Moreover, in the NFL’s CBA and Personal Conduct Policy, the
340
341
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appeal goes directly before hearing officers appointed by the Commissioner, or before the Commissioner himself.351 In the UAW–
Ford relationship, there is no foreseeable scenario in which the
person responsible for imposing discipline on the employee may
also handle the appeal.352 The UAW-Ford’s more comprehensive
grievance process seems to be a more equitable remedy than the
NFL’s.
4. New York City Police Department
Aside from the auto industry, the service industry provides
another opportunity to compare the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary, and appeal power. This section will discuss the discretionary power that the Commissioner of the New York City Police
Department (“NYPD”) has to not only discipline police officers
for their on-site and off-site behavior, but also the role that the Police Commissioner has in disciplinary appeals.
Unlike the previously discussed disciplinary proceedings, the
Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority lies within New
York’s State Code, as opposed to a collectively bargained agreement, as decided by the New York’s Court of Appeals in the 1999
case, Montella v. Bratton.353 The court in Montella ruled:
“[P]rovisions in the Charter and Code make clear that the Legislature determined to ‘leave the disciplining of police officers, including the right to determine guilt or innocence . . . to the discretion of
the Police Commissioner, subject, of course, to review by the
courts pursuant to CPLR article 78.’”354
The ruling in Montella was reaffirmed in the 2006 case, Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v. New
York State Public Employment Relations Board.355 There, the Patrol
Benevolent Association, the police officer representative, was chal351

See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2.
Compare UAW CBA, supra note 311, at art. VIII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10,
at art. 46.
353
See Montella v. Bratton, 93 N.Y.2d 424, 430 (1999) (holding that police officer
discipline is authorized exclusively to the police Commissioner, pursuant to New York
City’s Administrative Code).
354
Id. at 430.
355
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp’t Relations
Bd. (PBA), 6 N.Y.3d 563, 577 (2006).
352
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lenging the Public Employment Relations Board’s determination
that the changing of certain discipline procedures was not something that needed to be bargained over.356 The court had to juggle
“Taylor Law,”357 which requires a public employer to negotiate a
change in “terms and conditions of employment,”358 with New
York City’s Administrative Code granting disciplinary decisions
exclusively to the Police Commissioner.359 The court ultimately
ruled in favor of New York City’s Charter and Code, rather than
Taylor Law, and held that the disciplinary changes were within the
Police Commissioner’s discretion and did not need to be bargained
over.360
The authority for the police Commissioner in disciplinary decisions lies within the New York Administrative Code.361 Section 14115 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Police Commissioner:
[I]n his or her discretion, on conviction by the
commissioner, or by any court or officer of competent jurisdiction, of a member of the force of any
criminal offense, or neglect of duty, violation of
rules, or neglect or disobedience of orders, or absence without leave, or any conduct injurious to the
public peace or welfare, or immoral conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer, or any breach of discipline, to punish the offending party by reprimand,
forfeiting and withholding pay for a specified time,
suspension, without pay during such suspension, or
by dismissal from the force . . . .362

356

See id. at 570.
The Public Employees Fair Employment Act, more commonly known as Taylor
Law, is a New York State Statute, requiring, among other things, a public employer to
negotiate over any changes made to terms and conditions of employment. See N.Y. CIV.
SERVICE LAW § 209-a(1)(d) (2012).
358
See N.Y. CIV. SERVICE LAW § 204(2).
359
See PBA, 6 N.Y.3d at 572–74; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a); NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(a) (2015).
360
See PBA, 6 N.Y.3d at 576–77.
361
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115.
362
Id.
357
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Although the investigations that give rise to discipline can occur internally, they may also be recommended by the Civilian
Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”).363 The CCRB is essentially a
forum where civilians can submit complaints of potential misconduct committed by a police officer.364 Although the complaints are
generally related to behavior of the officers while on-duty, there
may also be complaints submitted related to the off-duty behavior
of police officers.365 When the CCRB receives a civilian complaint
for an officer’s off-duty behavior, it forwards that complaint along
to the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), which handles off-duty police officer misconduct.366 After a hearing and investigation is either initiated by the IAB, or follows a CCRB forwarded complaint,
the Police Commissioner is authorized to take action.367
Section 14-115 grants the Police Commissioner the authority to
discipline officers not only for being convicted of a crime, but for
“immoral conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer.”368 This language gives a very broad amount of discretion to the Police Commissioner in handling disciplinary matters involving officers in his
or her department. Whether conduct is “immoral” or “unbecoming” is a subjective determination. For example, recently a New
York City Police Officer was disciplined after cursing at and berating an Uber driver.369 In a separate situation, seventeen New York
363

See APU and Police Discipline, NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml
[https://perma.cc/A38M5E45] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
364
See id.
365
See Frequently Asked Questions, NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/faq/faq.shtml#a1 [https://perma.cc/R2TS-JZY9]
(last visited June 2, 2016); Alan Yuhas, NYPD Officer Disciplined After Foul-Mouthed Rant
at Uber Driver, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/apr/01/nypd-officer-investigation-rant-uber-driver
[https://perma.cc/GR8Q-Z8QS].
366
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 365.
367
See Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York. v. New York State Pub.
Emp’t Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 563, 572–74; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a); NEW
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(a).
368
NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a).
369
See Caroline Bankoff, Newly Badgeless NYPD Detective Says He’s Sorry for Freaking
Out at Uber Driver, NEW YORK MAG. (Apr. 4, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2015/04/nypd-detective-sorry-for-uber-driver-rant.html
[https://perma.cc/C5F9-VW8Y].
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City Police Officers were disciplined after making racist posts on
Facebook about the West Indian Day Parade.370 These examples
illustrate that even in situations where police officers are not necessarily violating laws, officers may still be disciplined for their conduct while both on-duty and off-duty.
Even with this broad range of discretion there is a limiting section, as officers still are disciplined:
[O]nly on written charges made or preferred against
them, after such charges have been examined, heard
and investigated by the commissioner or one of his
or her deputies upon such reasonable notice to the
member or members charged, and in such manner
or procedure, practice, examination and investigation as such commissioner may, by rules and regulations, from time to time prescribe.371
This caveat provides a sort of procedural due process right to
the officers before punishment may be made against them. It acts
as a safeguard, preventing punishment imposed by the Police
Commissioner before the officer has an opportunity to defend
themselves.372 This internal limiting function is something that the
NFL doesn’t provide until the grievance stage.373 This due process
right is important because the opportunity for an officer to defend
him or herself is provided prior to any sort of drag-out grievance
process taking place, providing the officer an additional due
process right and helping to maintain a calm and amicable working
environment. In the NFL, the Commissioner only needs to follow
the written notice requirement.374 There is no formal hearing that
must take place before imposing discipline on a player.375

370

See Joe Kemp, NYPD Disciplines 17 Cops Who Posted Racist Facebook Comments About
West Indian Day Parade, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/nypd-disciplines-17-cops-posted-racist-facebook-comments-westindian-day-parade-article-1.1142642 [https://perma.cc/QE75-W4CN].
371
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(b).
372
See id.
373
Compare id., with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
374
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a).
375
See id.
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Additionally, the Police Commissioner has the authority to
suspend officers while a trial involving the officer is pending under
Section 14-123.376 If the officer is found innocent of the charges,
however, he is due back pay from the date the suspension began.377
Lastly, the Police Commissioner may place an officer on probation
after a conviction, though probation may not last more than a
year.378 During the probationary period, however, the Police
Commissioner may impose further punishment on the officer.379
The Police Commissioner’s disciplinary power over New York
City police officers is identical to the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary power over players. Although there is no definitive phrase
such as “best interests,” “conduct detrimental,” or “for cause,”
the city’s Administrative Code does provide an enumerated list of
possible grounds for discipline.380 Among that list is the “conduct
unbecoming of an officer” provision, which may be read similarly
to the previously discussed clauses granted to commissioners or
managers.381 Additionally, the power to discipline lies exclusively
with the New York City Police Commissioner, and he may delegate
that responsibility, similarly to the NFL Commissioner.382 In sum,
the New York City Police Commissioner’s disciplinary power is
more than comparable to the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary
power, as they are quite similar.
Another interesting aspect of the disciplinary procedure instituted by both the NFL and the NYPD is that in the NFL’s new
Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL Commissioner is authorized to
suspend a player while an investigation is ongoing.383 In fact,
Commissioner Goodell was explicit about consulting with the
376

See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-123.
See id.
378
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(d).
379
See id.
380
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115.
381
See id.
382
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(b).
383
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 5. “In cases in which a violation relating to a crime of
violence is suspected but further investigation is required, the Commissioner may
determine to place a player or other employee on leave with pay on a limited and
temporary basis to permit the league to conduct an investigation.” Id. This is known as
the “Commissioner Exempt List.” Id.
377
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NYPD in adding this power in the 2014 Policy.384 It is likely based
off of the Police Commissioner’s power under section 14-123 to
suspend an officer while any investigation of a legal matter is ongoing.385
A formal grievance procedure can be found in New York City’s
Administrative Code, under section 14-125386 the grievance procedure looks similar to the policy in place in the NFL.387 Under section 14-125, the officer wishing to file a grievance over a dismissal
or demotion must do so in a written application to the mayor of
New York City.388 From there, the mayor determines whether or
not a rehearing before the Police Commissioner will take place,
based on the facts and reasons proffered in support of a rehearing.389 At the rehearing, if the Police Commissioner determines
that the demotion or termination was done incorrectly, then he
may reinstate or reposition the grieving officer to the position held
prior, “and allow him or her the whole of his or her time since such
dismissal, to be applied on his or her time of service in the department . . . .”390 The Police Commissioner may also fashion an additional, or separate, remedy if he determines that such a remedy is
just.391 The Police Commissioner, however, may affirm the dismissal or demotion based on the evidence.392
Lastly, an officer who was dismissed or demoted without a
formal hearing may issue a written grievance to the mayor requesting such an opportunity to be heard.393 From there, the mayor may
or may not authorize such a proceeding, in which the Police Com384

See Ginger Adams Otis, Roger Goodell Prepares NFL’s Tougher Personal Conduct
Policy, Modeled on NYPD Practices, in Wake of Ray Rice Incident, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec.
10, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/roger-goodell-prepares-nflnypd-style-conduct-rules-article-1.2040149 [https://perma.cc/ULS4-T65C].
385
Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-123, with 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at
5.
386
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125.
387
Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note
10, at art. 46 § 2.
388
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(a).
389
See id.
390
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(c).
391
See id.
392
See id.
393
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(e).
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missioner is to hold a formal hearing over the matter in which the
officer was disciplined.394 After the hearing takes place, the Police
Commissioner may reinstate the officer or place him back in his
position prior to the demotion, or he may affirm the discipline.395
As stated above, this grievance procedure is similar to the NFL
Commissioner’s power at the grievance stage.396 In both instances,
not only is the Commissioner issuing the initial punishment, but he
is also the one rendering a decision on appeal.397 This should not
come as a major surprise though, as Commissioner Goodell has
previously approved of the manner in which the NYPD handles
officer discipline.398 Although the NFL’s stated focus of consulting
with the NYPD was merely to learn how they handle discipline
during an ongoing investigation, they apparently took a similar approach to the grievance process regarding employee discipline. In
the NFL’s new Personal Conduct Policy, a grievance is handed
under the terms of Article XLVI of the CBA.399 Article XLVI, as
discussed before, grants the NFL Commissioner the discretionary
power to act as the body that has the discretion to hear a grievance
filed by a player.400
II. CONFLICT
The main issue that the NFL is currently facing stems not from
the Commissioner’s power to discipline players at the outset, but
in the determination of the severity of the punishment and the
Players’ rights to appeal that punishment. Ultimately, the due
process rights afforded to NFL players in player discipline are not
on par with those of other professional athletes or employees in
other industries.401
394

See id.
See id.
396
Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note
10, at art. 46 § 2.
397
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125; 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art.
46 § 2.
398
See Report: New NFL Conduct Policy to Borrow from NYPD Playbook, CBS NEWS (Dec.
10, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-new-nfl-conduct-policy-toborrow-from-nypd-playbook/ [https://perma.cc/462R-W2C7].
399
See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 7.
400
See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a).
401
Compare supra Section I.C, with supra Section I.D.
395

2016]

COMMISSIONER’S POWER & PLAYERS’ RIGHTS

1105

In terms of the initial punishment, there is no dispute over
whether the Commissioner should have the basic power to impose
discipline on players. As discussed, such a power is a fundamental
part of not only sports, but in other employment settings as well.402
What is an issue, however, is the Commissioner’s power to subjectively determine punishment as he sees fit, based on the conduct of
the player.403 In the other examples provided, the initial disciplinary power does rest with the commissioner, or supervisor, also,
but is different when looking at the entirety of the disciplinary
process.404
In the other contexts, the players or employees disciplined are
provided an opportunity to be heard before discipline is imposed.405 In the NFL, such an opportunity to be heard is not provided to the players.406 The only due process right explicitly required is notice of the pending punishment,407 and not being punished for the same incident twice. Because the NFL is a private
labor context though, there is no requirement at all for players to be
provided certain due process rights.408
In the other contexts, aside from the New York Police Department, the commissioners or supervisors ordinarily do not have the
power to appoint themselves as the hearing officer for the player
challenging his or her punishment.409 This prevents the respective
commissioners, or supervisors, from having complete authority
over a disciplinary decision. Additionally, although the New York
City Police Commissioner does have the power to appoint himself
as the hearing officer, there is an additional right provided to the
disciplined police officer, granting him or her the right for the opportunity to be heard before punishment is issued.410 Although the
NFL Commissioner may grant such an opportunity to a player before issuing punishment, that opportunity is not a defined right, as
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410

See supra Sections I.B–D.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.C.1.
See supra Section I.C.1.
See supra Section I.A.2.
See supra Sections I.D.1–3.
See supra Section I.D.4.
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it is with the NYPD, or even in the MLB or NBA.411 The opportunity to be heard before punishment is issued is a crucial due
process right, where an NFL player would be able to possibly mitigate their discipline through an explanation of the situation. And
though the NFL player may have the chance to be heard during an
appeal of their discipline, the NFL Commissioner may ultimately
appoint themselves as hearing officer and uphold his or her own
disciplinary determination.412
Where this situation gets even trickier is in the fact that courts
typically defer to the decision made by an arbitrator. Although
NFL players may be able to challenge the impartiality of the arbitrator, such a challenge is difficult to prove, and ultimately, courts
are reluctant to overturn the decisions made by arbitrators.413
Thus, even in an instance where the NFL Commissioner may give
the appearance of impartiality, it would still require a strong showing by a player challenging the Commissioner’s impartiality in order for the court to overturn the Commissioner’s decision.414
In tying this all together, the NFL is currently faced with a twofold problem: first, in determining what rights players should have
during the initial punishment process, and during their appeal
process; and second, in determining who should decide the initial
punishment, how the severity should be determined, and who
should hear a player’s appeal of the punishment. Balancing the due
process rights of the players with the League’s desire to protect
itself from “conduct detrimental” is an issue that can only be rectified by examining due process rights provided to employees in other labor contexts.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
It is likely that we will see some sort of change in the NFL
Commissioner’s role in the disciplinary process. From March 20 to
March 23, 2016, NFL Management and the NFL Players’ Association met in Boca Raton, Florida, for their annual meeting to discuss
411
412
413
414

Compare supra Section I.C, with supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.
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various issues concerning the League.415 Player discipline, and a
potential change in the Commissioner’s involvement in it, was
touched upon during the meeting.416 Although there were discussions about future change initially, the talks broke down and no
agreement was reached.417 It is still unknown as to whether there
will be a change to the Commissioner’s role in player discipline
moving forward.418 Nevertheless, it is worth exploring what a possible change could look like, and what it should look like, in the future.
In fashioning a solution as to how the NFL Commissioner’s
disciplinary power can better account for additional due process
rights for the players, it is important to look at the previously mentioned power structures, as well as the ideas proposed by internal
members of the NFL.419 Furthermore, it is also important to not
only look at the initial punishment power, but also at the power of
the Commissioner in the appeal process. Because the appeal
process acts as a limiting function to the authority to impose an initial punishment, both stages impact one another and need to be
considered in determining a proper power structure.
Although the examples of disciplinary structures discussed
provide a small sample size, it seems that a common theme exists,
particularly at the initial punishment stage. At the initial punishment stage, both the sports’ commissioners and the employers (or
415
Key NFL Offseason Dates for 2016, NFL.COM: AROUND THE NFL (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000636092/article/key-nfl-offseason-datesfor-2016 [https://perma.cc/333L-RDZQ].
416
Ron Clements, NFL, NFLPA Moving Toward Deal to Strip Roger Goodell of Discipline
Authority, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/nflnews/4698431-nfl-nflpa-near-deal-to-end-roger-goodell-discipline-authority
[https://perma.cc/UP5A-LWW9].
417
Jim Trotter, Talks over Roger Goodell’s Disciplinary Role Take “Massive Step
Backwards,” ESPN (Mar. 24, 2016), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/15053643/talksnfl-nflpa-reduction-roger-goodell-role-break-down [https://perma.cc/7R5R-4PS6]
418
Mark Maske, Little Optimism Remains over Possible Reforms to Roger Goodell’s
Disciplinary Role, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/sports/wp/2016/04/13/little-optimism-remains-over-possible-reforms-to-rogergoodells-disciplinary-role/ [https://perma.cc/LEB2-8SYN].
419
See Ken Belson, Roger Goodell Open to Changing Role in N.F.L. Disciplinary Process,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/sports/football/
roger-goodell-open-to-changing-role-in-nfl-disciplinary-process.html
[https://perma.cc/A4DG-ABYQ]; see generally supra Parts I–II.

1108

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1051

commissioners) in other industries enjoy a broad range of discretionary power when imposing initial discipline on an employee or
player.420 A possible explanation for the broad range of discretionary power afforded to commissioners during the disciplinary
process is the idea that companies and organizations want to be
able to police their own members.421 In enabling the supervisors,
managers, and commissioners to handle initial employee discipline,
this goal is met.
At the first stage of my proposed solution, I believe that the
NFL Commissioner should still be the one to impose initial discipline. The “best interests” clause, and the “conduct detrimental”
language that functions as an extension of it, is an integral part of
not only the history of commissioner power, but of sports history in
general.422 As a matter of fact, such discretionary power at the initial discipline stage is consistent with all four examples discussed
above.423
Starting with MLB in 1921, Commissioner Landis demanded to
have the power to take action on behalf of the “best interests” of
baseball.424 This broad range of power, which encompasses the
power to discipline players, has been included in the various
CBAs.425 In the NBA, the same power and language is granted to
the Commissioner under the framework of the NBA’s Constitution.426 The Commissioner’s broad power to discipline players has
been supported, albeit reduced, in cases such as the Latrell Sprewell incident and the “Malice at the Palace.”427 In the New York
City Police Department, the Police Commissioner has the same
exclusive power to discipline police officers under the City’s Administrative Code and Charter.428 Although the Code lists examples of behavior that will be disciplined, the section does give the
420

See supra Sections I.C–D.4.
Susan L. Merrill, Internal Investigations, SG091 ALI-ABA 91, 114 (2002) (providing a
rationale for handling discipline internally).
422
See supra Sections I.C–D.2.
423
See generally supra Part II.
424
See supra Section I.B.
425
See supra Section I.B.
426
See supra Section I.D.2.
427
See supra Section I.D.2.
428
See supra Section I.D.4.
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broad phrase “conduct unbecoming of a police officer” which
grants the Police Commissioner the power to discipline officers for
similar conduct that is proscribed by MLB, NBA, and NFL.429
Lastly, in the UAW–Ford relationship, Ford has the power to discipline employees “for cause.”430 Although some examples are
provided in the company guidelines, “for cause” is broad, and is
worded so that management cannot discipline an employee arbitrarily.431 The “for cause” standard requires that the employee engage in some form of conduct that would warrant discipline, similar
to the “conduct detrimental [to the NFL]” provision.
Additionally, the NFL’s “conduct detrimental” standard, and
the Commissioner’s disciplinary power, have been supported when
independent hearing officers have reviewed it. The power has been
upheld in court,432 it is language that the player unions have agreed
to in bargaining through all three major sports,433 and that power
should continue to be a part of the NFL Commissioner’s job.
A change that I do recommend at the initial stage is the inclusion of the right to a hearing before the commissioner imposes discipline, as modeled from the NYPD’s handling of misconduct by
an officer.434 As of now, the Commissioner in the NFL must simply
meet a notice requirement in informing the player and NFLPA of
the discipline within the time specified.435
I would, however, retain the Commissioner’s Exempt List in
place under the current Personal Conduct Policy. The concept of
providing an opportunity to be heard before a final punishment,
while simultaneously placing the player on leave with pay during
the investigation, are not mutually exclusive ideas. As seen in the
Rice, Hardy, and Peterson situations, it is possible to temporarily
suspend players with pay while ultimately providing them with an

429

See supra Section I.D.4.
See supra Section I.D.3.
431
See supra Section I.D.3.
432
See supra Part I.
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See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a); 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at
art. XII § B; NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 §§ (c)–(d).
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See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(b) (2015).
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opportunity to be heard prior to imposing the final punishment.436
Ultimately, under my proposal, the Commissioner would need to
provide the player with an opportunity to be heard before issuing
punishment, while also placing the player on paid leave via the
Commissioner’s Exempt List, which would add a step to the initial
punishment stage.
A possible alternative to the Commissioner being the sole person empowered with discretionary power in imposing punishments
would be to designate a person, mutually agreed upon by the players and the League, to decide punishment issues. Although the
CBA’s language does provide for something similar to that in Article XLVI, by granting the Commissioner the authority to delegate, there is not a requirement in granting exclusive power to such
a designated person.437 Out of the examples discussed above, the
closest thing to having such a person comes from the NFL itself,
with the “disciplinary officer” in the Personal Conduct Policy. As
discussed above though, the Commissioner does not need to delegate the discipline decision to the officer, and when he does not,
the officer’s recommendation is exactly that: a recommendation.
Having such a designated person is not a foreign concept, as this is
something that Commissioner Goodell has actually mentioned
himself.438
Ultimately, at the initial punishment stage, it seems best to
keep the NFL Commissioner’s power to govern in the best interests of the League intact. The Commissioner represents, at least in
theory, an unbiased party looking out for the League as a whole,
not any one particular team. Additionally, by enabling the Commissioner to handle the disciplinary decisions, player conduct is policed from within, by an individual who has experience in disciplinary matters. Although an agreed-upon third party with the exclusive power to impose initial discipline could be possible, such an
arrangement has never been done before in any of the industries

436

This allows the League to complete a thorough investigation prior to issuing
punishment so one does not end up with a situation similar to that of Rice where the
suspension is increased after new evidence comes to light.
437
See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46.
438
See Belson, supra note 419.
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discussed above.439 Nevertheless, Commissioner Goodell has admitted recently that he would be open to vesting the initial discipline power in such a way.440
Although the initial punishment policy under my solution
would remain relatively the same, the appeal procedure would not.
Granting the Commissioner the power to not only impose the initial punishment, but then to appoint himself as the person to hear
the appeal, does not seem to encourage impartiality in the appeal
process.441 Because he will already have ruled on the punishment,
he is likely to be pre-disposed to a particular judgment on the appeal. Enabling a new person—or people, in a panel of hearing officers—to oversee the appeal will provide for a second party, who was
not involved in the initial decision, and thus will likely be less influenced by the prior punishment when making a final determination.
A panel of hearing officers would be comprised of three members: one selected by the NFLPA, one selected by the League, and
a third arbitrator jointly selected by the parties, in a manner that is
similar to the MLB and NBA.442 A list provided by a major arbitration agency, such as the American Arbitration Association, would
be given to both parties, and each party would cross off arbitrators
on the list, one-by-one, until a final arbitrator remained; if they
could not agree on that final arbitrator, then the two selected arbitrators would be the ones to agree on the third. The panel would
hear all appeals regardless of the source of the disciplinary power.
In the MLB, each side selects one of the three arbitrators, and the
parties agree on the third. In the NBA, only one arbitrator, who is
also mutually-agreed upon, handles the appeals.443
The arbitration panel would serve for the duration of one season, though all three members may be reelected at the start of the
next season. In both the NBA and MLB though, either party can
fire the mutually agreed upon arbitrator during a set period of
time.444 This presents both sides with the opportunity to prevent
439
440
441
442
443
444

See supra Sections I.C–D.
See Belson, supra note 419.
Compare supra Section I.C, with supra Section I.D.
See supra Sections I.D.1–2.
See supra Section I.D.2.
See supra Section I.D.2.
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an unfair arbitrator constantly upholding disciplinary decisions, or
constantly overturning decisions. The NBA incorporates a slightly
different approach than the MLB, because the NBA Commissioner
retains the power to hear appeals for minor disciplinary decisions.445 Such a situation could be possible moving forward in the
NFL, if the players were to agree to it.
By having a panel of three hearing officers, with a designated,
and mutually agreed upon, impartial third officer, the player filing
the grievance would be provided a more unbiased hearing. Though
members of both the NFLPA and the Owners have considered
changing the Commissioner’s power at the initial stage, they have
not looked to do so at the appeal stage.446 The Commissioner himself, as discussed before, has admitted to being open to such a reduction of his initial punishment power, but was dismissive of relinquishing his appeal power to a neutral arbitrator.447 Despite this,
the League will continue to face pressure to change the appeal
process as other sports have implemented a neutral arbitrator to
handle disciplinary appeals.
By allowing each side to appoint their own arbitrator, and then
agreeing upon the third, disputes can be handled by people who are
inside the business. In such a scenario, the people who are making
the appeal decisions are close enough to the goings on of the NFL
to understand the ramifications of their decisions, how the player’s
conduct conforms to the League, and how that type of conduct has
usually been handled. By having an internally experienced panel,
decisions can be made more efficiently, and the appeal process will
be run more smoothly. Additionally, rather than having the grievance processed outside the NFL, or having the Commissioner be
the “judge, jury, and executioner,” the three-member panel provides an objective body to hear grievances.
The three-member panel would have the authority to affirm a
punishment, reduce it, or eliminate it entirely. The ability to impose punishment, as stated above, would belong exclusively to the
Commissioner, so the panel would not be enabled to increase a
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player’s discipline. Under my proposal, the decision of the threemember panel would be final and binding on both parties, though
either side would have the right to bring a claim in court over a
procedural error, or if the panel overstepped their authority in deciding a grievance.
The three-member panel would have the same authority as the
arbitration panels in the UAW–Ford agreement, the MLB, and the
NBA. As seen in the Latrell Sprewell incident, the Commissioner
does have the broad power to discipline a player, but the Grievance
Arbitrator can reduce punishment down to what is fair and reasonable given the circumstances. Such a power to be able to cap the
Commissioner’s disciplinary power, much like with Ford, MLB,
and NBA, belongs in the NFL.
CONCLUSION
With the various avenues that the Commissioner can discipline
players—Constitution, CBA, Personal Conduct Policy, and
UPC—it is important to nail down why his power exists under
each. Under the CBA, Personal Conduct Policy, and UPC, the
Commissioner would maintain his current broad disciplinary power. This makes sense because he is unbiased in the sense that his
loyalty is to the NFL as a whole rather than to an individual franchise, and discipline under the aforementioned sources seeks to
eliminate potential conduct that would negatively impact the
League as a whole.
In order to limit the Commissioner’s power, the grievance procedure proposal does remove the Commissioner’s power to oversee appeals on which he rendered an initial punishment. That type
of authority, aside from the NYPD, is basically unheard of. None of
the MLB, NBA, or Ford managers are provided such an expansive
role in the appeal process. By eliminating that power, and implementing a three-member panel to hear player grievances, the policy
of handling disputes internally is maintained, while an objective
body, unrelated to the initial punishment, is the deciding body of
the appeal.

